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The government is engaged in a homeland-security project to safeguard
the population's health from potential terrorist attacks. This project is
politically charged because it affords the state enhanced powers to restrict
personal and economic liberties. Just as governmental powers relating to
intelligence, law enforcement, and criminal justice curtail individual
interests,' so too do public health powers.
1. America is in the early stages of a "national conversation ... about what kind of country
we want to live in and what balance we will tolerate between public safety and private freedom."
Matthew Brzezinski, Fortress America, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2003, § 6, at 38. Compare David
Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 955-60 (2002) (discussing the ways that government
is curtailing interests in an unfair and ineffective manner), with WILiAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE
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Disease-control measures invade each of the major spheres of personal
liberty: vaccination, physical examination, and medical treatment interfere
with bodily integrity; disease surveillance, reporting, and data collection
interfere with informational privacy; and isolation, quarantine, and
criminal sanctions for risk-taking behavior interfere with liberty.2 The
effects of public health powers on economic interests are just as palpable.
In many cases, personal control measures such as quarantine interfere with
competitive markets. As the movement of people and goods are restricted,
for example, businesses cannot freely sell their products and services; nor
can they compete fairly with those who are not fettered by the exercise of
control measures.3 Additionally, much public health regulation is directed
squarely at business activities, thereby limiting freedom of enterprise:
inspections and administrative searches; permits and licenses;
occupational safety and health rules; nuisance abatements; and "takings,"
including regulatory takings. In each case, there is a constraint on
economic liberty, albeit the freedom of contract, pursuit of a profession,
or use of property.4
Homeland security is controversial because it places in conflict two
sets of important values: the public's health and safety on the one hand
and personal and economic liberties on the other. Some argue that we can
have it both ways: protect the fullest expression of personal and economic
liberties and attain the maximum degree of public health safety.5 Although
LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME(1998) (suggesting that there are necessary trade-offs
between civil liberties and national security), and Christopher Woo & Miranda So, The Case for
Magic Lantern: September II Highlights the Need for Increased Surveillance, 15 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 521, 521-22 (2002) (justifying the use of Magic Lantern, a technology that permits law-
enforcement agencies to capture key strokes made on a computer without having to physically enter
the home or business where the computer resides, even though it may curtail some civil liberties).
See generally Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003) (discussing how government tends to usurp civil
liberties in emergency situations).
2. See LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 113-234
(2000) [hereinafter GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW] (reviewing powers affecting personal interests);
see also LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHIcs: A READER (2002) [hereinafter
GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS].
3. See Richard A. Epstein, The Informal Economy: The Moral and Practical Dilemmas of
an Underground Economy, 103 YALE L.J. 2157, 2161 (1994) ("One prerequisite for a level playing
field is that both parties be bound by the same legal rules and constraints. A system which requires
B to labor under restrictions that do not bind his rival A is patently unfair and has consequent
corrosive effects on moral sentiments.").
4. For a review of these powers affecting economic interests, see GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH
LAW, supra note 2, at 237-305; see also GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS, supra note 2,
at 229-63.
5. E.g., George J. Annas, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and Civil Liberties, 346 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1337, 1340 (2002) (asserting that the idea of "a trade-off between effective public health
measures and civil rights is simply wrong").
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security and liberty sometimes are harmonious, more often than not they
collide. Advancing the common good frequently requires limitations on
individual interests. Society therefore faces hard trade-offs: individuals
must forego some liberty to achieve a healthier and safer population;
conversely, the government must permit some diminution of security to
achieve a freer society.
The dilemma requires understanding the strength of each set of
interests, recognizing the critical choices, and making the trade-offs
knowingly in advance of a public health emergency. The pitched battle
over civil and economic liberties in an era of bioterrorism6 will not be
settled without a principled framework for balancing individual and
collective interests.
First, it is important to conceptualize the nature and magnitude of the
threat of bioterrorism. Biological agents are likely to be a weapon of
choice for terrorists: the technology is comprehensible and affordable,
surveillance and detection is difficult, and the destabilizing effects are
substantial." Part I offers a risk analysis ofbioterrorism, while recognizing
that decision-makers lack full information. I conclude that the level of risk
is sufficient to consider liberty-limiting powers designed to efficiently
detect and respond to the threat.
In response to the risk assessment described in Part I, government has
proposed and enacted a set of powers that interfere with personal and
proprietary interests:8 vaccination, treatment, and quarantine, as well as
nuisance abatements and takings of private property. Commentators often
claim that the state should not possess these and other liberty-limiting
powers. In Part II, I explain why asking whether the government should
have liberty-limiting powers is the wrong question. The risk from
bioterrorism can be stratified into three categories:. -significant risk,
moderate risk, and negligible risk. The right question is, what powers
6. I define bioterrorism as "the intentional use of a pathogen or biological product to cause
harm to a human, animal, plant, or other living organism to influence the conduct of government
or to intimidate or coerce a civilian population." Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Model State
Emergency Health Powers Act: Planning for and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally
Occurring Infectious Diseases, 288 JAMA 622, 623 (2002).
7. Homeland security necessarily includes safeguarding against naturally occurring
infectious diseases. Although the risk is at least as great as that of bioterrorism, this Article does
not focus on naturally occurring infectious diseases. For an account of the threat of naturally
occurring infectious disease, see David P. Fidler, The Globalization of Public Health: Emerging
Infectious Diseases and International Relations, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11, 22-23 (1997);
Brian J. McCarthy, The World Health Organization and Infectious Disease Control: Challenges
in the Next Century, 4 DEPAUL INT'L L.J. 115, 118-22 (2000).
8. These powers are found in the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act. CTR. FOR
LAW AND THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH, GEORGETOWN UNIV. & JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV., THE MODEL
STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (Dec. 21, 2001), at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/
MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf. [hereinafter MSEHPAJ.
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should the state have to deal with each level of risk? Assuming the
government's intervention is well targeted, the significant risk scenario
unequivocally justifies the exercise of state power; arguably, a moderate
level of risk could imbue the state with certain powers as well. Rather than
inquiring whether liberty-limiting power is ever legitimate, commentators
should ask what circumstances must exist to justify the exercise of
authority.
In Part III, I examine two major political theories to test the assumption
that state power is in some circumstances justified-liberalism and
communitarianism. 9 Although liberalism has become the defacto public
philosophy in America, communitarianism is equally plausible as a
competing theory, particularly in the context of a public health emergency.
At first sight, liberal and communitarian responses to the legitimacy of
state power appear quite different. However, on more careful reflection,
these two philosophical traditions diverge only in the harder cases. In this
Part, I explain why the exercise of public health power to avert a
significant risk is supportable under both theories. Similarly, liberalism
and communitarianism would reject liberty-limiting authority in the
absence of discernible risk. In the case of moderate risk, hard trade-offs
are required between individual and collective interests.
If the state power to control health threats is legitimate, the central
question then is, under what circumstances the power should be exercised.
In Part IV, I offer a framework for balancing personal freedom and
collective security. I would allow government to pursue public security
through the full panoply of traditional powers, but require conformance
with a structured set of standards and procedures set by elected officials
in advance of a public health emergency. I incorporate safeguards
traditional to a liberal democracy, such as objective criteria for
interventions (based upon scientific risk assessments), due process, and
checks and balances. Yet, I would not make the state's burden so great as
9. I could just as easily have tested the assumption that state public health power is
sometimes justified by examining the exercise of that power historically and through constitutional
analysis. The states have used police power to control infectious disease during all periods of
American history and continue to do so. See WILLIAM J. NovAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW
AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 191-233 (1996). This is evidenced by
historical accounts of disease epidemics and pervasively enacted public health statutes at the state
and federal level. See Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Law and the Public's Health: A Study of
Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 59, 128 (1999) (analyzing state
communicable disease legislation). Not only has public health power been prevalent throughout
American history, it has also been constitutionally upheld. There is ample evidence from
constitutional history and judicial precedent that states have police power authority to protect the
public's health and safety. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905) (upholding
a vaccination requirement for smallpox); GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW, supra note 2, at 61-83,
203-67.
1109
to chill effective disease surveillance and intervention. If the criteria and
procedures required are excessively onerous, there remains too little space
for the public interest. A framework can be structured into law that affords
government the power to act, while deterring overreaching.
This framework involves hard trade-offs. It will not satisfy those who
see either individualism or public security as sacrosanct. The nation would
forego some security out of deference to democratic and constitutional
values. Individuals would lose some freedom and autonomy out of
deference to communitarian values. In the end, individuals require both a
certain level of freedom secured in a constitutional democracy and a
certain level of health secured by a political community that takes public
health seriously.
I. CONCEPTUALIZING THE NATURE AND MAGNITUDE OF THE
THREAT OF BIOTERRORISM
The homeland security project supported by the Bush Administration
and many states entails significant inroads into personal and proprietary
freedoms in advance of a bioterrorist attack (through enhanced
surveillance) and after an attack (through infectious-disease control
powers). The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA or
Model Act), written by the Center for Law and the Public's Health at the
request of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), provides
states with ample legal auth6rity.' ° The MSEHPA affects interests in
privacy, autonomy, and liberty through powers of active surveillance and
data exchange, vaccination and treatment, and isolation and quarantine."
It affects proprietary interests through powers of nuisance abatement,
destruction and seizure of property, and licensing.' 2
The Model Act has galvanized the debate around the appropriate
balance between personal rights and public goods. 3 But even before
10. See MSEHPA, supra note 8.
I!. For a discussion of the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, see James G. Hodge,
Jr. & Lawrence 0. Gostin, Protecting the Public's Health in an Era of Bioterrorism: The Model
State Emergency Health Powers Act, in IN THE WAKE OF TERROR: MEDICINE AND MORALITY IN
A TIME OF CRISIS 17-32 (Jonathan D. Moreno ed., 2003); Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health Law
in an Age of Terrorism: Rethinking Individual Rights and Common Goods, 21 HEALTH AFF. 79
(2002); Gostin et al., supra note 6, at 622-28.
12. See sources cited supra note 1I.
13. The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving
Weapons of Mass Destruction (the Gilmore Commission) has recommended that each state that has
not already done so, to adopt the Model Act (modified to fit that state's particular requirements)
or develop its own legislation. See ADVISORYPANELTO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES
FOR TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, ANNUAL REPORT § IV, at 63-64
(2002), available at http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/terror4.pdf [hereinafter GILMORECOMM'N].
For a defense of the Model Act, see Gostin et al., supra note 6, at 625-28; Gostin, Public Health
II10 FLORIDA 1A W RE IW [Vol. 55
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engaging in such a discourse, it is important to address a threshold
question: Is the risk of a bioterrorist event sufficiently credible to warrant
serious consideration of restricting personal and proprietary freedoms? It
is unnecessary to consider trading liberties, economic or civil, for
protection against remote events. However, if the harm to be averted is
reasonably likely, then a rigorous assessment of the trade-offs between
enhanced government power and individual freedom becomes important.
To some extent, the controversy over homeland security derives from
the inability to quantify the risk.'4 Scholars, accustomed to policy analysis
derived from risk-benefit ratios, are being forced into decisions at a time
when such ratios cannot easily be calculated." Risk assessments in an age
of terrorism lack complete data: Are biological agents available to
terrorists? Do they have the technical skill to "weaponize" these agents by,
for example, refining the agent to create efficient aerosolized dispersion
or genetically manipulating the agent to produce increased virulence? Are
the methods of agent delivery capable of creating widespread infection
rates among the population?
This Part considers the plausibility of the government's claim that
bioterrorism poses a significant national-security threat. Despite imperfect
information, credible evidence exists to support the perceived threat.' 6
Law in the Age of Terrorism, supra note 11, at 86-91. For critiques of the MSEHPA, see Annas,
supra note 5, at 1339 (criticizing the Model Act because trade-offs between public health and civil
liberties are not always necessary); George J. Annas, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and Human
Rights, 21 HEALTH AFF. 94, 94 (2002) (noting that it is "unnecessary and counterproductive to
sacrifice basic human rights to respond to bioterrorism," especially in modem times); Ronald Bayer
& James Colgrove, Public Health vs. Civil Liberties, 297 So. 1811 (2002) (detailing civil liberty
advocates' criticism of the Model Act in both its draft and current version); Gene W. Matthews et
al., Legal Preparedness for Bioterrorism, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 52, 53 (2002); see also Ronald
Bayer & James Colgrove, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and the Law, 21 HEALTH AFF. 98, 99-100
(2002).
14. E.g., Steve Connor, Scientists CondemnAlarmist Official Propaganda over Bioterrorism,
INDEPENDENT (London), Jan. 31, 2003 (quoting "senior scientists who believe that the resulting
panic is potentially worse than the threat [of bioterrorism] itself"); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, FDA Asks
Public about Smallpox Vaccine Tests on Children, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2002, at Al 4 (quoting Dr.
Karen Midthun, who supervises vaccine research for the FDA, as saying, "Everyone agrees that the
risk of smallpox through a bioterrorism event is not zero.... But how small or how large is that
risk? Given that it is so difficult to quantitate, it makes it difficult to know whether there is
potentially any benefit to these children.").
15. Some argue that even with reasonably complete information, the lay risk perception of
terrorism is exaggerated. See Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and
Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 100 (2002); see also Siobhan Gorman, Fear Factor, NAT'L J., May 10,
2003 (noting that the fear associated with terrorism may preclude the population from making calm,
level-headed policy decisions).
16. A report by the National Intelligence Council for the Central Intelligence Agency
concluded that the U.S. population is vulnerable to bioterrorism and emerging and reemerging
infectious diseases. NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, THE GLOBALINFECIOUS DISEASE THREATAND
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First, bioterrorism is theoretically plausible because biological weapons
are nearly as easy to develop as chemical weapons, far more lethal, and
will likely become easier to deliver.'7 Unlike nuclear weapons, they are
inexpensive to produce and the risk of detection is low.'" Second, certain
countries are known or suspected to have biological weapons programs, 9
and nonstate actors have become important as well.20 Third, biological
agents already have been deployed against American populations.2' The
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES (2000).
17. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., PuBLIc HEALTH RESPONSE TO BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL
WEAPONS (2d ed. forthcoming 2003) (discussing how advances in microbiology and airborne
infectious diseases in the 1920s and more recent advances in biotechnology and genetic engineering
have resulted in an increased threat from biological weapons), available at
http:/lwww.who.int/emc/pdfslBIOWEAPONS_execsum2.pdf (pre-publication edition).
18. In 1998, the U.S. Commission on National Security in the twenty-first Century concluded
that biological agents are the most likely choice of weapons for disaffected states and groups. U.S.
COMM'N ONNAT'L SEC. IN THE 21 ST CENTURY, NEW WORLD COMING: AMERICAN SECURITY IN THE
21ST CENTURY: SUPPORTING RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS (1999), available at
http://www.nssg.gov/Reports/reports.htm.
19. Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya, Syria, Russia, China, Israel, and Egypt have been cited
as possibly developing biological weapons. See MILTON LEITENBERG, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES, (prepared for CONFERENCE ON EMERGING
THREATS ASSESSMENT: BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM AT DARTMOUTH COLLEGE, July 7-9 2000); Elisa
D. Harris, Chemical and Biological Weapons: Prospects and Priorities After September 11, 20
BROOKINGS REV. 24 (2002); Judith Miller, A Nation Challenged: Bioterror, N.Y. T'IMES, Nov. 19,
2001, at B 1; see also Reducing the Threat of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Hearing Before
the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002) [hereinafter Hearings]
(statement of Carl W. Ford, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
discussing both state and non-state actors who possess biological weapons).
20. GILMORE COMM'N, supra note 13:
[T]he greatest threat to international peace and stability comes from rogue states
and transnational terrorist groups that are unrestrained in their choice of weapon
and undeterred by conventional means. The September II attacks showed that
terrorist groups were much better organized, much more sophisticated, and much
more capable of acting globally than we had assumed possible.
Id. (quoting John Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security); see
also Bill Frist, Public Health and National Security: The Critical Role of Increased Federal
Support, 21 HEALTH AFF. 117, 118 (2002) (discussing an unclassified memo from the National
Intelligence Council that warned, "[t]he biological warfare capabilities of state and non-state actors
are growing worldwide").
21. More than fifteen years before the intentional distribution of anthrax in 2001, another
successful bioterrorist attack had been carried out in the United States. In 1984, a group
contaminated salad bars in Oregon with salmonella causing 750 people to become ill. See David
A. Ashford et al., Planning Against Biological Terrorism: Lessons from Outbreak Investigations,
9 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 515, 518 (2003) (noting investigations on outbreaks in the
United States that revealed six potential bioterror attacks and forty-one other outbreaks for which
no cause was ever identified; also noting that it required up to twenty-six days to identify the cause
[Vol. 55
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intentional dispersal of anthrax through the postal system in the aftermath
of September 11, 2001 demonstrated the potential for bioterrorism.22
Finally, government modeling or "tabletop" exercises simulating
biological attacks in the United States-such as Dark Winter (smallpox)23
and TOPOFF (plague)24 -revealed serious weaknesses in public health
preparedness. 25  Both exercises predicted large-scale morbidity and
fatalities from a biological attack. 26 There is good evidence that a
successful bioterrorist attack would have large-scale effects on the
economy and the population's health.27
This Part also describes the deterioration of the public health
infrastructure. The likelihood of a bioterrorism event brings into focus the
nation's ability for early detection and response. Systems designed to
detect and respond to an attack have been neglected, with the result that a
large-scale event would be overwhelming. 8 Shoring up the infrastructure
would aid in our response not just to bioterrorism, but also to emerging
infectious diseases.29 The Part concludes that the significant risks of
of the outbreak); Tatsha Robertson & Robert Schlesinger, Microbes Were Mail-Ordered-Lax
Controls Let Extremists Easily Obtain Anthrax, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 6, 2001, at A9 (noting
several different unsuccessful attempts to use bioterrorism in the United States).
22. See Larry M. Bush et al., Index Case of Fatal Inhalational Anthrax Due to Bioterrorism
in the United States, 345 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1607, 1607, 1610 (2001); John A. Jernigan et al.,
Bioterrorism-Related Inhalational Anthrax: The First 10 Cases Reported in the United States, 7
EMERGING INFEcTIOus DISEASES 933, 933-34 (2001).
23. See Tara O'Toole et al., Shining Light on "Dark Winter," 34 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 972 (2002).
24. Thomas V. Inglesby et al., A Plague on Your City: Observations from TOPOFF, 32
CtuNICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 436 (2001). TOPOFF II models the effects ofa pneumonic plague
dispersal in Illinois and a radiological device ("dirty bomb") in Washington state. Press Release,
U.S. Department of Justice, Justice Department, State Department to Conduct Exercises Combating
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Oct. 8, 2002), available at http://wN '.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/
October/02_ag_585.htm.
25. See Inglesby et al., supra note 24, at 441; O'Toole et al., supra note 23, at 981-82.
26. See Inglesby et al., supra note 24, at 438; O'Toole et al., supra note 23, at 979.
27. See Inglesby et al., supra note 24, at 442-43; O'Toole et al., supra note 23, at 979.
28. See Inglesby et al., supra note 24, at 439-43.
29. The risk from emerging infectious disease is at least as important to the public's health
as the risk from bioterrorism. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., EMERGING INFECTIONS: MICROBIAL
THREATS TO HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 140 (Joshua Leederberg et at. eds., 1992); David P.
Fidler, Return of the Fourth Horseman: Emerging Infectious Diseases and International Law, 81
MINN. L. REv. 771, 829 (1997); Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Preventing Emerging
Infectious Diseases: A Strategy for the 21st Century Overview of the Updated CDC Plan, 47
(RRI5) MORBIDrrY& MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1 (1998). In the United States, infectious diseases
(excluding those that cause AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases) cause about 90,000 deaths
annually, and an estimated 740 million nonfatal illnesses. Gostin et al., supra note 9, at 97. Since
the 1 970s, the United States has been confronted with emerging diseases like tuberculosis, Lyme
disease, AIDS, hepatitis C virus, cryptosporidiosis, and hantavirus. See McCarthy, supra note 7,
at 119-20 (2000); see also CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ADDRESSING EMERGING
bioterrorism to the public's health warrant careful discussion of how
competing interests should be balanced.
A. The Efficiency of Biological Weapons Development
Biological agents are attractive for their ease of development, low risk
of detection, and lethal potential.3" Since the terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center and Pentagon and the subsequent intentional dispersal of
anthrax in the fall of 2001, government" and academia32 have carefully
considered the nature of the risk posed by biological weapons. Because of
the plethora of possible agents that could be used in a bioterrorist attack
and multiple methods of dissemination, evaluating the risk is daunting.3
Consequently, the United States is engaged in serious debates about the
appropriate amount of resources to spend on preparing for an attack, and
the best way to expend them. 4
INFEcTIOus DISEASE THREATS: A PREVENTION STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES 2 (1994),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/publications/eid_plan/ default.htm. Fortunately, many of
the same public health mechanisms that must be in place for a bioterrorism event are the same that
should be strengthened for more efficient management of emerging infectious diseases. For
example, the same surveillance system that will alert authorities to an outbreak of smallpox will
alert authorities to an outbreak of a naturally occurring disease. While a discussion of emerging
infectious diseases is beyond the scope of this Article, resources will be allocated more efficiently
and policies will have a greater effect if they serve not only to protect the public from terrorism,
but from infectious diseases as well.
30. See, e.g., Barry Kellman, Biological Terrorism: Legal Measures for Preventing
Catastrophe, 24 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 417,427-29 (2001) (discussing the risks of bioterrorism
in terms of their ease of implementation and overwhelming potential to harm).
3 1. E.g., Inglesby et al., supra, note 24 (reviewing an exercise directed by Department of
Justice to evaluate governmental response to a biological attack); CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvS., PROGRAMS IN BRIEF: BIOTERRORISM AND
PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS, at http://www.cdc.gov/programs/bio.htm (last visited Feb. 14,
2002) (outlining a list of the CDC's measures designed to respond to bioterrorism as part of its
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program); News Release, White House, President Signs
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Bill (June 12, 2002) (noting how the bill will protect the
nation against bioterrorism attacks).
32. See, e.g., Kellman, supra note 30, at 430-37.
33. See id.
34. For example, there is a debate whether resources should be allocated on the state level
or the federal level. James G. Hodge, Jr., Bioterrorism Law and Policy: Critical Choices in Public
Health, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 254, 258 (2002) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of
having the federal government take the lead in combating bioterrorism); Annas, supra note 13, at
94 ("A bioterrorist attack on the United States ... is inherently a matter of national security,
making it a federal matter."); Michael Moser, Bioterrorism and Civil Liberties, 347 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 856, 856 (2002) (editorial from Kansas Department of Health & Environment) (disputing
George Annas' contention that federal agencies should lead the "public health response to
bioterrorism"). Additionally, there is a debate regarding how resources should be allocated. E.g.,
Ceci Connolly, Bush Planfor Smallpox Vaccine Raises Medical, Fiscal Worries, WASH. POST, Dec.
15, 2002, at A33 (noting the controversial decision to devote resources towards vaccinating health
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When compared to other methods of attack, bioterrorism has the
potential to be highly cost-effective. The covert use of biological weapons,
of course, is less expensive than feeding, clothing, and training a standing
army. Because many biological agents are found in nature,35 easily
accessible, or purchasable,36 producing a biological weapon is cheaper
than developing a nuclear or chemical weapon.
The raw material for a biological weapon is the infectious agent itself.
A small sample is all that may be needed because of its potency or the fact
that many agents can be reproduced in mass quantities in a laboratory."
For example, a single gram of crystalline botulinum toxin, evenly
officials for smallpox as opposed to other national security initiatives); Sue Ellen, Connect the
Dots; Addressing the Threat of Bioterror, CI. TRIB., July 21, 2002, at I (noting the controversy
in deciding how many people should be vaccinated for smallpox under the Department of Health
and Human Services' plan); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FIsCAL YEAR 2003: PROTECTING THE HOMELAND
19 (2002) (outlining the President's plan to allocate funds for bioterrorism), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2003/pdf/budget.pdf [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S 2003
BUDGET].
35. For example, the organism that causes the plague exists on every populated continent
except Australia. Thomas V. Inglesby et al., Plague as a Biological Weapon: Medical and Public
Health Management, 283 JAMA 2281, 2282 (2000). Anthrax is naturally present in agricultural
regions of the Middle East, South and Central America, Southern and Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa,
and the Caribbean. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ANTHRAX, at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/anthraxg.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2002).
Tularemia naturally occurs in North America and Eurasia. David T. Dennis et al., Tularemia as a
Biological Weapon: Medical and Public Health Management, 285 JAMA 2763, 2764 (2001).
36. For example, ricin, a potent poison, can be made from castor beans. CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQ) ABOUT RiCIN, at
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/ricin/faq/index.asp (last visited Jan. 16, 2003); see also Ken
Silverstein & David Isenberg, Homegrown Horror: The Prospects for All-American Bioterroism,
13 Am. PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 2002, at 12 ("Biological agents are effective in small amounts and are
relatively cheap and easy to produce. A 1999 Defense Department study found that a domestic team
with biological training was able to produce two pounds of mock aerosolized anthrax for about $1.6
million.").
37. See, e.g., The Miniaturization of Mass Destruction, 67 CAN. & WORLD BACKGROUNDER
28 (2002):
Biological weapons are small, potent, relatively cheap, and hard to detect.
According to one report, a state-of-the-art biological laboratory could be built and
made operational with as little as $10,000 U.S. worth of off-the-shelf equipment
and could be housed in a small room. As well, graduate university students in
laboratories around the world know enough about recombinant DNA and cloning
technology to design and mass-produce such weapons. Biological agents can
mutate, reproduce, multiply, and spread over a large geographic area by wind,
water, insect, animal, and human transmission.
dispersed and inhaled, could kill more than one million people.3" Some
biological agents that the CDC has indicated are of the greatest concern39
can be isolated from soil samples in many parts of the world.4" Others
could potentially be purchased from countries with bioweapons
programs.4 Once a strain of the disease agent is found, it can be replicated
easily, or genetically manipulated by more sophisticated miscreants to
increase its virulence or resistance to drug therapy.42
Developing a distribution method may pose problems for some less
sophisticated terrorists. The most effective method of transmission for a
large-scale attack for most agents is through the airborne route,43 by
creating an aerosol of the pathogen and releasing it into the air. This
38. Stephen S. Arnon et al., Botulinum Toxin as a Biological Weapon: Medical and Public
Health Management, 285 JAMA 1059, 1059 (2001).
39. The CDC separates biological agents into three categories. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, BIOLOGICAL AGENTS/DISEASES, available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/
agentlist.asp (last updated Nov. 21, 2002). Category A diseases (anthrax, botulism, plague,
smallpox, tularemia, and viral hemorrhagic fevers) are "high-priority" agents because they can be
easily disseminated or transmitted from person to person, result in high mortality rates, might cause
public panic, and require special action for public health preparedness. Id. Category B diseases
(brucellosis, epsilon toxin, food safety threats such as salmonella, glanders, melioidosis,psittacosis,
Q fever, ricin, staphylococcal enterotoxin B, typhus fever, viral encephalitis, and water safety
threats like cryptosporidium) are moderately easy to disseminate, result in moderate morbidity
rates, and require enhancements of CDC's diagnostic capacity. Id. Category C diseases (emerging
infectious diseases like Nipah virus and hantavirus) are the third highest priority because of their
availability, ease of production, and potential for high morbidity and mortality rates. Id. For a
discussion of the symptoms, fatality rates, and treatments for CDC Category A Disease Agents, see
infra Appendix.
40. For example, the organisms that cause anthrax and tularemia are found in the soil. Dennis
et al., supra note 35, at 2764; Thomas V. Inglesby et al., Anthrax as a Biological Weapon: Medical
and Public Health Management, 281 JAMA 1735, 1736 (1999).
41. See Edward P. Richards, The Role of Medical and Public Health Services in Sustainable
Development, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11299 (2002) (noting that Russia had stockpiled large amounts
of smallpox virus, and that it is possible some has gotten into the hands of terrorists or rogue
nations).
42. The former Soviet Union used genetic engineering to enhance the biological weapons it
developed. See Christopher J. Davis, Nuclear Blindness: An Overview of the Biological Weapons
Programs of the Former Soviet Union and Iraq, 5 EMERGING INFECTIOuS DISEASES 509, 510-11
(1999), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no4/pdf/davis.pdf.
43. See, e.g., Mark G. Kortepeter& Gerald W. Parker, PotentialBiological Weapons Threats,
5 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 523, 524-25 (1999) ("[Anthrax and smallpox are the two with
greatest potential for mass casualties and civil disruption [because] . . . [b]oth are stable for
transmission in aerosol."). However, many other types of bacteria, viruses, and toxins may also be
transmitted through the air. See VA. DEP'T OF EMERGENCY MGMT., Virginia Terrorism
Preparedness, Weapons of Mass Destruction, available at http://www.vaemergency.com/
prepare/terrorismtoolkit/terrguide/weapons/. For example, bacteria such as brucellosis, glanders,
plague, Qfever (a rickettsial disease), and tularemia are airborne. Id. Viruses such as arboviral
encephalitis, and Lassa fever are airborne. Id. Toxins such as botulinum, mycotoxins, ricin, and
staphylococcal enterotoxin B can also be airborne. Id.
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requires that the disease be milled to a particle size that is effectively
inhaled and retained in the lungs, and does not fall to the floor or become
quickly scattered by the wind." However, many have overcome this
difficulty;45 for example, the October 2001 outbreak contained highly
refined anthrax spores.46 Once aerosolized, circulation systems in large
office or residential complexes could efficiently distribute an agent
throughout the building.47 Additionally, even low-technology methods of
distribution could be effective."
44. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE TO BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL
WEAPONS 9 (2001) ("[M]icro-meteorological variation in the atmosphere could result either in the
agent becoming diluted to harmlessness or in the cloud missing the target due to some veering of
the wind."), available at http://www.who.int/emc/pdfs/BIOWEAPONSexecsum2.pdf. Ifthe size
of the aerosolized agent were too large to be inhaled, the agent would also be an ineffective
weapon. See David Abel, Are There Other Threats?, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 4, 2001, at 14
("Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo tried but failed at least three times to disperse the toxin in aerosols
in Japan.").
45. See Evidence of Chemical and Biological Weapons in Iraq (Nat'l Pub. Radio broadcast,
Feb. 7, 2003) (discussing a video that Secretary of State Colin Powell alleges is Iraq using a jet to
spray over 2000 liters of simulated anthrax); see also Joan Lowy, Anthrax Found Around World,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 10, 200 1, at 9A ("The accidental release ofaerosolized anthrax from
a germ weapons facility in Sverdlovsk in the former Soviet Union in 1979 resulted in at least 79
cases of anthrax infection and 68 deaths."). But see Johanna McGeary, What Does Saddam Have?
Iraq May Not Have a Nuclear Bomb, But There's Strong Evidence It Has Chemical and Biological
Weapons. Its Past Suggests It Wants a Bigger Arsenal, TIME, Sept. 16, 2002, at 26 ("But
weaponizing most pathogens so that airborne bombs can spray them effectively over large areas
remains a challenge for Saddam's engineers."). See generally Hearings, supra note 19, at 8-11
(statement of Carl W. Ford, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research) (discussing
the state of delivery systems of various states).
46. E.g., Earl Lane & Laurie Garrett, Experts Say Envelope Leak a Possibility, NEWSDAY,
Oct. 23, 2001, at A2 ("[W]ell-refined anthrax powder could be sufficiently minute to escape the
comers of envelopes without much more agitation than a mere tossing from one stack of mail to
another.").
47. Earl Lane, America's Ordeal; Inhalation Anthrax Disperses, NEWSDAY, Nov. 7, 2001,
atAl6
The small, easily breathable spore particles that are the most dangerous to human
health behave like a gas .... [aerosolized anthrax spores] will remain airborne
and disperse out of a building within a matter of hours . . . via either the
ventilation system or natural air circulation. "Wherever air leaks out, it will get
out".. . [A]n aerosol with particles in the range of I to 5 microns across "is like
a perfume. It's in the air. It will float forever."
Id. (citing Michael Osterholm, a University of Minnesota specialist on bioterrorism). See, e.g.,
McGeary, supra note 45, at 26 ("[D]isseminating [a gram of anthrax] is relatively easy: no missiles
are needed, just a crop duster, backpack sprayer, even a perfume atomizer.").
48. For example, those willing to become martyrs for their cause could infect themselves with
diseases like smallpox and pneumonic plague, which are transmissible from person to person, and
attempt to spread the disease on crowded streets, airports, or subways.
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Once the agent is reproduced, it can be brought across borders, on
airplanes, and into crowded arenas without being easily detected. The
pathogens themselves are small, portable, and not identified by metal
detectors or current security systems. 9 While the agent's survival may
require special conditions, like non-exposure to light or air," such
precautions are not as easily noticed as metallic objects or traces of
explosives.
In addition to the relative ease with which they can be manufactured
and transmitted, biological agents are efficient means of disrupting a
society due to their lethality. In the anthrax attacks using the United States
Postal Service, almost half of those who inhaled particles died."' The
effects of the anthrax outbreak were attenuated, however, because anthrax
does not spread from person to person. 2 Other biological agents that are
currently considered to be of serious concern to government officials may
49. See, e.g., McGeary, supra note 45, at 26 ("[A] gram of anthrax could serve as a poor
man's suitcase bomb: that's I trillion spores, enough for 100 million fatal doses. Hiding,
transporting and disseminating that type of poison is relatively easy ... ."); see also Hearings,
supra note 19, at 64 (statement of Alan P. Zelicoff, Senior Scientist, Sandia National Laboratories
to the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate) (hypothesizing, "[wlere there to be let us
say a dissemination of a few pounds of anthrax from an aerosol device in downtown Washington,
tens of thousands of people would become expose [sic] to anthrax spores. Most would become
ill."); O'Toole et al., supra note 23, at 974 ("For example, William Patrick, a senior scientist in the
US offensive biological weapons program before its termination in 1969, has stated that I g of
weaponized smallpox would be sufficient to infect 100 people via an aerosol attack.").
50. See Peter Mazur, Letters to the Editor, Some Facts About Anthrax Poisoning, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 26, 2001, at A21:
[Aerosolized biological agents] have only a limited lifetime. They coalesce, they
settle under gravity, and the water of which they are composed rapidly evaporates.
The organisms within are also subject to biological decay (although less so for the
resistant anthrax spore) from dehydration, and exposure to oxygen and sunlight.
Their physical and biological effective lifetimes thus depend complexly on
meteorological conditions such as relative humidity and wind velocity.
Id. However, anthrax spores are resistant to light and air:
[Anthrax] [s]pores are dormant in soil in many places in South Dakota and can
remain so for decades and are typically very resistant to adverse conditions
(drying, heat, ultraviolet light, and many disinfectants). The bacteria do not form
spores in living tissue; sporulation occurs only after the infected body has been
opened and exposed to oxygen.
S.D. DEP'T OF HEALTH, ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ABOUT ANTHRAX (Nov. 2, 2001), at
http://www.state.sd.us/doh/Bioterrorism/4ddanthrax.htm.
51. Jernigan et al., supra note 22, at 942.
52. Kevin P. O'Connell et al., Issues in Preparednessfor Biological Terrorism: A Perspective
for Critical Care Nursing, 13 CLINICAL ISSUES 452 (2002).
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be transmitted from person to person, exponentially increasing the number
of people likely to be affected.53 Current information regarding the
mortality rate of the diseases most feared by the CDC could underestimate
the lethality of these diseases. The information on the effects of diseases
is gathered through experience with the naturally occurring forms of the
disease. If a more effective transmission method is used, or if the disease
agent is engineered to increase its lethality, the effects could be even more
devastating.
In addition to the dispersal of a disease agent into the air, public health
officials must guard against contamination of food and water sources. The
World Health Organization considers the deliberate contamination of food
"a real and current threat."54 Contamination of food with Salmonella
typhimurium, botulinum toxin, hepatitis A, or Escherichia coli 0157:H7
could sicken thousands, if not hundreds of thousands.55 Similarly, infecting
a public water supply with cryptosporidium or Giardia lamblia could
* affect every member of the community.56
In summary, the use of bioterrorism is equally, if not more, concerning
than conventional (e.g., firearms or explosives), chemical, or nuclear
threats: it is readily available, inexpensive to produce, more difficult to
detect, and more efficient in its lethal effects.
B. Biological Weapons Development and Deployment by
Nations and Non-State Actors
Not only are biological weapons more efficient, certain countries and
non-state actors have already developed them."' Countries known to have
had biological weapons programs include the former Soviet Union, Japan,
and Iraq.58 More than ten other countries, including Iran, North Korea, and
Syria, are suspected of having biological weapons.59
53. For example, smallpox is contagious, especially in the stage where the rash is present,
as is pneumonic plague. Id. at 461-65.
54. FOOD SAFETY DEP'T, WORLD HEALTH ORG., FOOD SAFETY ISSUES: TERRORIST THREATS
TO FOOD 1 (2002), available at http://www.who.int/fsf/Documents/teltorism andfood-cn.pdf.
55. Id. at 5.
56. See Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Water Quality Laws and Waterborne Diseases:
Cryptosporidium and Other Emerging Pathogens, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 847, 847 (2000).
However, the Environmental Protection Agency believes that the risk of an attack on the water
supply is limited because of the "dilution effect," whereby an extremely large amount of disease
agent would be required to substantially affect the system. Tim De Young & Adam Gravley,
Coordinating Efforts to Secure American Public Water Supplies, 16 NAT. RES. & ENV'T 146, 146
(2002).
57. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
58. See Harris, supra note 19, at 24.
59. Id.
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The Soviet Union began experimenting with biological weapons in the
late 1920s.6" In the 1970s, the Biopreparat, an organization designed to
carry out offensive biological weapons research and development, was
formed.6' The Biopreparat produced plague, tularemia, glanders, anthrax,
smallpox, and Venzuelan-equine encephalomyelitis.62 In 1979, in the
former Soviet Union, an apparent release of anthrax from a military
facility resulted in a large outbreak.63 More than seventy people were
infected, with over sixty deaths attributed to the outbreak.64 A few years
earlier, an open-air test of a weapon containing the smallpox virus resulted
in three deaths, 250 people quarantined, and 43,000 people vaccinated. 65
While the countries that comprised the former Soviet Union are not
currently antagonistic towards the United States, there is concern that
Soviet-trained scientists that developed the biological weapons program
are now unemployed and "potentially available to the highest bidder., 66
Japan also is known to have had an extensive biological weapons
program.67 The Japanese biological warfare group fed cultures of
Clostridium botulinum to prisoners with lethal effect during Japan's
occupation of Manchuria, which began in the 1930s.6" During World War
II, a branch of the Japanese army is reported to have dropped fleas infected
with the plague over populated areas of China, causing outbreaks. 69
Although no longer a threat, Iraq had also been reported to have
developed several biological agents for use as weapons.7" For example,
Iraq had developed anthrax for biowarfare,7' and since the Gulf War, had
60. Davis, supra note 42, at 509.
61. Id. at 510.
62. Id.
63. Matthew Meselson et al., The SverdlovskAnthrax Outbreak of1979, 266 So. 1202, 1202-
03(1994).
64. Id. at 1203.
65. David Brown, Soviets Had '71 Smallpox Outbreak; Report: 3 Die, 43,000 Vaccinated
After Test of Biological Weapon, WASH. POST, June 16, 2002, at A25.
66. Frist, supra note 20, at 118. While the smallpox virus is supposed to be held only by the
United States and Russia, there is wide speculation that others have it. See David A. Koplow, That
Wonderful Year: Smallpox, Genetic Engineering, and Bio-terrorism, 62 MD. L. REV. 417, 466
(2003).
67. George W. Christopher et al., Biological Warfare: A Historical Perspective, 278 JAMA
412, 413 (1997).
68. Id.
69. Inglesby et al., supra note 35, at 2282.
70. E.g., U.N. SCOR, 4701st mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4701 (2003) (statement of Colin
Powell, U.S. Secretary of State, noting that Iraq has declared that Iraq has 8,500 liters of anthrax
although it is suspected that it has much more anthrax at its disposal and that it has several active
plants that are currently producing biological agents), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/
resguide/scact2003.htm.
71. Raymond A. Zilinskas, Iraq 's Biological Weapons: The Pastas Future?, 278 JAMA 418,
419 (1997).
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obtained drying machines that could be used to make a powder form of
anthrax for efficient aerosol dispersal.72 Botulinum toxin also had been
developed, 3 as had Clostridiumperfringens, a flesh-eating bacterium (the
cause of gas gangrene),74 and ricin, a potent poison.75 Iraq had acquired
methods of distributing these diseases by using crop sprayers and
potentially remote-controlled helicopters designed to spray aerosolized
agents.76
Although at one time states were the major players in the international
arena, the risk from non-state actors is growing.77 Organizations based on
fringe ideology have proven to be serious threats to peace and security.78
These non-state actors have proven capable of developing some level of
biological weapons.79
The Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo attempted to disperse aerosolized
botulinum toxin in Tokyo and at several U.S. military installations in Japan
between 1990 and 1995, but failed to kill anyone.8" The group later
released sarin nerve gas on the Tokyo subway, killing twelve and injuring
5000. Perhaps more disconcerting, traces of anthrax were found in an al
Qaeda laboratory near Kandahar, Afghanastan. 2 Al Qaeda documents
indicate that Osama bin Laden was pursuing a sophisticated bioweapons
program. 3 Fortunately, there is little evidence that the group has been
successful in acquiring biological weapons.8 4
The risk from biological weapons has been demonstrated not just in
faraway places, but within our borders. The United States had a large,
active biological weapons program from 1943 to 1969.5 The United States
72. Matt Kelley, Biological Weapons Could Give Iraq Way to Slow U.S. Attack, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Dec. 28, 2002, at A3.
73. Iraq admitted to production of 19,000 liters ofbotulinum toxin. Amon et al., supra note
38, at 1060.
74. Kelley, supra note 72.
75. Zilinskas, supra note 71, at 419-20.
76. Frist, supra note 20, at 118.
77. See Hearings, supra note 19 (discussing the potential threat of bioterrorism from non-
state actors).
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. Arnon et al., supra note 38, at 1060.
81. Michael Day, 1,000 Times More Deadly than Cyanide, DAILY EXPRESS (London), Jan.
8, 2003, at P4.
82. Susanne M. Schafer, Special Forces Will Prepare Afghan Army-U.S. Reports Finding
Components for Biological Weapons Factory, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Mar. 26,2002, at 3.
83. Michael R. Gordon, U.S.: Al Qaeda was Building Lab for Bioweapons, CHI. TRIB., Mar.
24, 2002, at 6.
84. GILMORE COMM'N, supra note 13, at 18.
85. INST. OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES, U.S. ARMY MED. RESEARCH, History of Biological
Warfare and Current Threat, in USAMRIID's [U.S. ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF
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researched anthrax, botulinum toxin, Francisella tularensis, Coxiella
burnetti, Venezuelan-equine encephalitis virus, Brucella suis, and
staphylococcal enterotoxin B.86 President Nixon officially ended the
offensive program unilaterally in 1969,87 and the United States ratified the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
Their Destruction in 1972.8 Stockpiles of these agents were destroyed in
the presence of witnesses in 1971 and 1972.89 The United States continues
to conduct a medical defensive program at the U.S. Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) in Fort Ditrick,
Maryland.90 The historical and current use of biological materials in the
United States poses a risk that pathogens may fall into the wrong hands.9'
Attacks in the United States have proven difficult for authorities to
unravel. So far, the menace from biological weapons has been small, but
the probability of future attacks may grow as the war on terrorism and the
struggles in Afghanistan and Iraq continue. In 1995, an anti-tax group
known as the Minnesota Patriots Council was found to have derived ricin
poison from castor beans.92 The cache was reportedly enough to kill more
than a hundred people.9a The group intended to murder a federal marshal
by contaminating a door handle with the poison.94 The plot was discovered
when the wife of one of the men brought the poison to police.95 The
INFECTIOUS DISEASES] MEDICAL MANAGEMENT OF BIOLOGICAL CASUALTIES HANDBOOK (Mark
Kortepeter et al. eds., 4th ed. 2001), available at http://www.vnh.org/BIOCASU/toc.htm (last
visited Feb. 12, 2003).
86. See id.
87. Christopher et al., supra note 67, at 415.
88. Id. One hundred forty-six countries have ratified the Convention. List ofState Parties to
the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, U.N. Doc.
BWC/CONF.V/INF.4 (2002), available at http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/bwc/pdf/vinf4.pdf.
89. See INST. OF INFEcOuS DISEASE, U.S. ARMY MED. RESEARCH, supra note 85.
90. See GILMORE COMM'N, supra note 13, at E4.
91. For example, federal criminaljustice authorities speculated that the anthrax outbreak may
have been the work of a person with access to military sources of weaponized anthrax. E.g., Kevin
Coughlin, Scientist Says She Can ID Anthrax Killer-Claims Five Insiders Gave FBI Same Name,
STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ), June 16, 2002, at 3 (noting that the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
initial profile of the perpetrator responsible for the anthrax outbreak was "a methodical scientist
with access to a top lab and military-grade anthrax"). Some argue that existing domestic and
international laws are not sufficient to combat bioterrorism. See generally Heather A. Dagen,
Comment, Bioterrorism: Perfectly Legal, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 535 (2000) (suggesting means to
improve laws pertaining to possession and use of agents of bioterrorism).
92. Robertson & Schlesinger, supra note 21.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See United States v. Baker, 98 F.3d 330, 333 (8th Cir. 1996).
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perpetrators were convicted of knowingly possessing a toxin for use as a
weapon.96
A second plot took longer to uncover. In 1984, an Oregon cult bought
salmonella bacteria from a germ bank and cultured it in backyard
laboratories.97 Close to the date of a local election, the group contaminated
restaurant salad bars, coffee creamers, and salad dressing with the
salmonella.98 The group hoped that enough people would become sick and
unable to vote so that they could influence the election.99 More than 750
became ill during the outbreak, although no one died."°° It took the
authorities over a year to realize that the outbreak had been intentional.'
Similarly, after a year and a half, the government has not been able to
discover who was behind the anthrax attacks that caused general panic and
sickened twenty-two people, five fatally. 2 From October until November
2001, anthrax-laced letters caused inhalational anthrax in eleven people,
and cutaneous anthrax in eleven more.'0 3 The attacks led to widespread
fear, massive nasal swab and prophylactic antibiotic campaigns, and
criticism about the way the outbreak was handled."° Only one of the six
inhalational anthrax survivors has returned to work. 5 Some feel haunted
by the disease, suffering from memory loss, fatigue, and personality
changes.0 6 The Federal Bureau of Investigation has tried its best to discern
the source of the attacks, thus far to no avail, underscoring the ease with
which a user of biological weapons can go unnoticed in our society. 7
96. Id.
97. Darrin Farrant, Germs ofMass Destruction, SUNDAY AGE, Feb. 17, 2002, at 11.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Robertson & Schlesinger, supra note 21.
102. Kirsten Weir, Anthrax: Year One, 88 CURRENT SCL 89 (2003); see also Jernigan et al.,
supra note 22.
103. Weir, supra note 102.
104. See, e.g., Ceci Connolly & Avram Goldstein, Anthrax Exposure Estimates Increased;
First Capitol Hill Aides Receive Vaccine Shots, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2001, at AI (noting that
government officials provided insufficient guidance on who should receive the vaccine in addition
to antibiotics); Edmund Sanders, Responses to Terror Public Health Issues: Anthrax Assurances
Cited as Threat to Public Trust Terrorism: Officials Insisted Mail Was Safe but Now Wonder,
Critics Call Early Response Too Hasty, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 5,200 1, at Al; Editorial, Headless Health
Agencies, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 28, 2002, at Al2 (criticizing the CDC's failure to recognize the
extent of the anthrax attacks).
105. Weir, supra note 102.
106. Id.; see also Lena H. Sun, Anthrax Patient Has Pneumonia, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2002,
at B2.
107. The FBI agents searched through the New Jersey neighborhoods from which several of
the letters were mailed, offered a one million dollar reward, and combed through 170,000 potential
leads and tips. Robertson & Schlesinger, supra note 21.
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Even still, the highly refined grade of the anthrax spores used may suggest
a link to the U.S. military's own biological research program. °8
C. The Potentially Large-Scale Effects of Biological Weapons
It is important to consider not only the probability of the risk of
bioterrorism, but also the severity of harm should the risk materialize.'0 9
By most accounts, a well-planned release of biological agents would have
a substantial effect on the public's health. In addition, containment
measures and generalized fear also would have a sizable impact on the
economy.
Estimating the effect an attack would have on the public's health is
difficult. Information about the spread of a disease and its fatality is
usually based on information gathered during naturally occurring
outbreaks. In some instances, this information may underestimate the
effects of the disease. Changes in the population may make people more
susceptible to infection.110 For example, risk assessments concerning
smallpox, including the effects of vaccination, may differ markedly from
historical understandings."' Today's population has a higher percentage
of immuno-suppressed individuals (e.g., HIV/AIDS, cancer, and organ
transplants). "2 In addition, pathogens may have evolved naturally or could
108. See Coughlin, supra note 91.
109. Four factors that are influential in analyzing risk to evaluate public health regulations are
the nature of the risk, the duration of the risk, probability of harm, and the severity of harm.
GOsTIN, PuLIC HEALTH LAW, supra note 2, at 94-97 (discussing the four factors).
110. See Mary E. Wilson, Infectious Diseases: An Ecological Perspective, 311 BMJ 1681
(1995) (noting how migration of people is often responsible for introducing an infectious disease
to a new region).
I11. See INST. OF MED., EXECuTIVE SUMMARY: MICROBIAL THREATS TO HEALTH
(forthcoming 2003) (noting the following factors that have altered the risk of infectious diseases
from historical risk assessments: microbial adaptation and change, human susceptibility to
infection, climate and weather, changing ecosystems, economic development and land use, human
demographics and behavior, technology and industry, international travel and commerce,
breakdown of public health measures, poverty and social inequality, war and famine, lack of
political will, and intent to harm).
112. See Donald A. Henderson et al., Smallpox as a Biological Weapon, 281 JAMA 2127
(1999) ("Smallpox was eradicated before human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) was
identified[] .... Vaccination of immune-deficient persons sometimes resulted in a continually
spreading primary lesion, persistent viremia, and secondary viral infection of many organs.") The
CDC recommends against vaccinating immuno-suppressed individuals (e.g., HIV/AIDS, cancer,
and organ transplants) unless they have been exposed to smallpox. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, SMALLPOX FACT SHEET: PEOPLE WHO SHOULD NOT GET THE SMALLPOX VACCINE
(2003), available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/vaccination/pdf/contraindications-
public.pdf/; see John G. Bartlett, Smallpox Vaccination and Patients with Human Immunodeficiency
Syndrome, 36 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 468 (2f)03). Because the population, today, has a
higher percentage of immuno-suppressed individuals than when past risk assessments were
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be engineered to be more lethal than their natural counterparts or to be
resistant to commonly used treatments. 3 The method of release also could
lend itself to the development of more deadly versions of the disease." 4
Regardless of these limitations on the usefulness of estimates, various
organizations have tried to calculate the number of fatalities that could
stem from a biological attack. The World Health Organization concluded
that, worst-case scenario, if fifty kilograms of Yersinia pestis (the
organism that causes the plague) were released as an aerosol over a city of
five million people, 150,000 could develop pneumonic plague, and 36,000
of those may die.' A Congressional analysis of the potential effects of a
release of 100 kilograms of aerosolized anthrax over Washington, D.C.
indicated that up to three million deaths could occur." 6
Table-top exercises, conducted by the military and various states,
designed to examine governmental response to a bioterror emergency
suggest similarly devastating effects to public health if an efficient
biological attack were to occur." 7 In one exercise conducted in 2001,
code-named "Dark Winter," prominent politicians portrayed the President
of the United States and the Governor of Oklahoma."8 The scenario was
a release of smallpox in shopping malls in Oklahoma City, Philadelphia,
and Atlanta.' 9 Three thousand people were supposed to have been initially
infected. 2 ° About two weeks after the attacks, it was estimated that 16,000
cases of smallpox would have been reported in twenty-five different states,
with ten other countries reporting cases.'21 Figure X demonstrates the rapid
spread of the disease.'22 Participating politicians found that they were
unfamiliar with the nature of a biological attack and with the policy
options available to them. 3 The scarcity of the vaccine posited in the
conducted, the risk assessment necessarily differs.
113. INST. OF MED., supra note I l1.
114. For example, the plague is usually transmitted by flea bites, and the most common
manifestation is bubonic plague. Inglesby et al., supra note 35, at 2282. If the disease were released
as an aerosol, it is likely that most would develop pneumonic plague, a more deadly form of the
disease. See id.
115. Id.
116. This analysis was conducted by the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S.
Congress. CTR. FOR CIVILIAN BIODEFENSE STRATEGIES, ANTHRAX FACT SHEET, 1999 (1999),
available at http://www.hopkins-biodefense.org/pages/agents/agentanthrax.html (last visited Nov.
27, 2002) [hereinafter ANTHRAX FACT SHEET].
117. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
118. O'Toole et al., supra note 23, at 973.
119. Id. at 974.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 979.
122. Id. at976.
123. Id. at 980.
exercise created problems for rationing treatment and medication. 124 The
rapidly spreading disease quickly overwhelmed the health care system. 125
In short, had the exercise been an actual emergency, the effects would
have been devastating.
Figure X
Smallpox cases reported at meeting 3 of the Dark Winter simulation exercise.
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Similarly, in another exercise, called "Top Official," or "TOPOFF," the
federal government and the states modeled the effects of an intentional
dispersal of plague. 26 The scenario involved the release of an aerosol of
Yersiniapestis in Denver, Colorado. 2 7 Denver was chosen in part because
124. The organizers of the exercise made key assumptions, including the scarcity of a vaccine.
Id. at 974. However, scarcity of a smallpox vaccine may no longer be an issue. E.g., Press Release,
White House, Frequently Asked Questions (Dec. 13, 2002) ("[Tjhere is enough smallpox vaccine
to vaccinate everyone who would need it in the event of an emergency."), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021213-3.html.
125. O'Toole et al., supra note 23, at 979-81.
126. Thomas Inglesby et al., A Plague on Your City: Observations from TOPOFF, 2
BIODEFENSE Q. 2 (2000), available at http://www.hopkins-biodefense.org/pages/news/
quarter2_2.html. The exercise occurred in May 2000. Id.
127. Id. The TOPOFF exercise also involved a chemical weapon event in Portsmouth, New
Hampshire and radiological event in Washington, D.C. Id.
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it had previously received domestic preparedness training and equip-
ment. '2 The state and county health agencies, the CDC, the Office of
Emergency Preparedness, and three local hospitals participated.'29 In the
exercise, which lasted four days, events progressed from the release of the
aerosol in the Denver Performing Arts Center one day, to 500 people with
symptoms being treated at local hospitals three days later.'30 Four days
after the release of the plague, estimates of those with pneumonic plague
ranged from 3700 to more than 4000, and between 950 and 2000 deaths
were estimated.' 3'
The exercise examined not only how many could become ill from a
bioterrorism event that utilizes a contagious disease, but how well the
government and public health infrastructure were able to address the
emergency. 132 Those that participated in the exercise found that "the most
striking observation [was] the recognition that the systems and resources
now in place would be hard-pressed to successfully manage a bioweapons
attack such as that portrayed in TOPOFF";133 there was no one clearly in
charge; channels of communications were blocked; and there was
indecision and delays in action.' 34 Antibiotic supplies became scarce;
officials could not agree on whether they should be administered
prophylacticly or only to those with symptoms; and distribution points
became clogged."3 Hospitals were quickly overwhelmed by the event;
"[t]here were not enough places to put sick people, triage people, put dead
bodies.' ' 136 Moreover, there was no clear sense of how to handle masses of
scared or sick people demanding antibiotics."'7 Public health resources in
place at the time TOPOFF was conducted were insufficient to meet the
demands of an epidemic, and the effects of a real plague outbreak would
have been severe.
It is clear that a successful and efficient bioterrorist attack would have
a significant impact on the public's health. Many would die, and even
more would fall ill. In addition to the human suffering of illness and death,
there would be large-scale effects on the economy. 3 ' There would be both
128. Id.
129. Id. One hospital had to end its participation early because it had so many actual patients
that it was unable to spare the resources the exercise required. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. For example, the cost of an anthrax attack is estimated to be $26.2 billion per 100,000
people exposed to the spores. CTR. FOR CIVILIAN BIODEFENSE STRATEGIES, supra note 116.
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direct and indirect expenses from an attack. Medicine, medical equipment,
and medical personnel would be needed, some of which might have to be
transported from remote locations. 39 Establishing areas of quarantine and
isolation would require securing buildings, ventilation equipment, food
and water transported to the areas, and enforcement personnel. 140
In addition to the expenses incurred in direct response to the attacks,
there would also be indirect costs. Commerce to and from the affected
areas would likely be halted, with a devastating effect on local businesses
and a spiraling effect in the national economy. 4' Those quarantined or
isolated would be unable to participate normally in daily life, costing
employers productive workers and requiring people to fill in where
necessary (e.g., daycare for children if parents are isolated). Other people,
afraid of becoming infected, may flee the city and theirjobs. Fear from the
attacks may cause people to lose faith in the financial markets, causing
panic and a drastic reduction in stock prices. 42 All of these costs would
have a significant effect on the economy.
While it is difficult to quantify all of the effects in advance of an attack,
the costs of an attack, both in human suffering and dollars, would be high.
The harm from a well-engineered attack would therefore be severe.
Compounding the effect is the fact that the public health infrastructure is
not yet prepared to handle such an event.
D. The Deteriorating Public Health Infrastructure
The threat of bioterrorism is compounded by the inability of public
health agencies to effectively detect and respond to possible incidents.
Numerous reports have drawn attention to the lack of public health
preparedness for bioterrorism and naturally occurring infectious
diseases. 43 The Institute of Medicine's landmark report on The Future of
139. See Joseph Barbera et al., Large-Scale Quarantine Following Biological Terrorism in the
United States: Scientific Examination, Logistic and Legal Limits, and Possible Consequences, 286
JAMA 2711, 2714-15 (2001).
140. See id.
141. See id. at 2715.
142. Adam Shell, Anthrax Concerns Chip Away at Stocks, USA TODAY, Oct. 18, 2001, at B4
(noting that just as the stock market was starting to recover after September I Ith, the anthrax
attacks started to weaken the market); Steven Syre & Charles Stein, Market Tugged by Light and
Dark Forces, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 16, 2001, at DI (noting that on Oct. 16, 2001, the market
dropped as news was released of additional anthrax attacks).
143. See, e.g., Infectious Disease Outbreaks: Bioterrorism Preparedness Efforts Have
Improved Public Health Response Capacity, But Gaps Remain: Testimony Before the Committee
on Government Reform, House of Representatives, 108th Cong. 2 (2003) [hereinafter Infectious
Disease Outbreaks Hearing] (statement of Janet Heinrich, Director, Health Care-Public Health
Issues); INST. OF MED., HEALTHY CoMMuNITIEs: NEW PARTNERSHIPS FOR THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC
HEALTH (Michael A. Stoto et al. eds., 1996); INST. OF MED., IMPROVING HEALTH IN THE
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Public Health in 1988 observed that the governmental public health
infrastructure was in "disarray""' and its 2003 report stated that in many
ways it "remains in disarray today."'45 The CDC concluded that, despite
recent improvements, the public health infrastructure "is still structurally
weak in nearly every area." '146
The Department of Health and Human Services' Office of the Inspector
General analyzed the readiness of a sample of twelve state and thirty-six
local health departments.'47 The report found that the public health
infrastructure was under-prepared to detect and respond to bioterrorism.'48
In order to cope with a bioterrorism event, state and local governments
must have health departments that can notice the outbreak through
surveillance, discover its cause through an epidemiologic investigation,
communicate effectively with response partners, have plans in place to
mobilize resources, and be prepared (legally and logistically) to
intervene.'49 The report found room for improvement in each of these
areas. 1
50
First, our surveillance systems are weak.' Surveillance systems
require physicians and laboratories to report certain communicable
diseases to state or local health departments.'52 However, many of the
departments surveyed noted that reports were not always timely and
complete. '53 Several of the health departments reported that they only look
at the reports weekly and do not analyze them in any systematic way.'54
Such inattentive monitoring will prolong the time it takes to discover that
a bioweapon has been released.
COMMUNITY: A ROLE FOR PERFORMANCE MONITORING (Jane S. Durch et al. eds., 1997); INST. OF
MED., USING PERFORMANCE MONrrORING TO IMPROVE COMMUNITY HEALTH: EXPLORING THE
ISSUES (Jane S. Durch ed., 1996); Katherine Eban, Waiting for Bioterror: Is Our Public Health
System Ready?, NATION, Dec. 9, 2002, at 11.
144. INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 19 (1988).
145. INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH IN THE 21ST CENTURY 103
(forthcoming 2003).
146. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
Executive Summary to PUBLIC HEALTH'S INFRASTRUCTURE: A STATUS REPORT (2001) [hereinafter
HHS STATUS REPORT] (prepared for the Senate Appropriations Committee).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 3.
149. See id.
150. Id. at iii.
151. Id. at8.
152. See id. at 8-9.
153. See id. at 8.
154. See id at 10; see also Infectious Disease Outbreaks Hearing, supra note 143, at 6 (noting
that some state public health officials reported chronic underreporting, and local public health
officials reported that they lacked the resources to sustain active surveillance).
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Once an outbreak is identified using reporting or other methods of
surveillance, an epidemiologic investigation must be conducted. Yet,
many of the health departments surveyed noted that they had inadequate
staff or equipment.'55 Laboratories were overwhelmed by the relatively
small outbreak of anthrax in 2001.156 Overall, the capacity to determine
that a biological attack is occurring is not yet in place.
The infrastructure for responding to an attack has serious flaws as
well. 57 Some states do not have well-developed communications plans.
158
Many states have not tested their mobilization procedures and most of the
health departments surveyed did not have complete plans for receiving,
organizing, and distributing federal aid. 59 The report also indicated that
four state and fourteen local health departments did not have all of the
laws and regulations necessary to activate and enforce emergency public
health and infection control measures in place." 0
In order to respond effectively to a bioterrorism event, these faults must
be considered and corrected. The current public health infrastructure is
inadequate to respond to a large-scale attack. Such an attack is plausible,
and likely to inflict severe damage if it occurs. In addition, strengthening
the public health infrastructure will protect us from another risk-the risk
from emerging infectious diseases."'
155. Almost half of the local health departments did not have an epidemiologist on staff. See
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STATE AND LOCAL
BIOTERRORISM PREPAREDNESS 9 (2002) (finding that seventeen of the thirty-six local health
departments surveyed did not have an epidemiologist on staff); see also HHS STATUS REPORT,
supra note 146; Infectious Disease Outbreaks Hearing, supra note 143, at 7 (noting personnel
shortages in public health departments and laboratories); id. at I I (reporting that few hospitals have
adequate medical equipment to handle a large-scale infectious disease outbreak); COUNCIL OF
STATE & TERRITORIAL EPIDEMIOLOGISTS, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF EPIDEMIOLOGIC CAPACITY
IN PUBLIC HEALTH: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13 (2003) (finding that over forty percent
of epidemiologists on staff at health departments lack formal academic training in epidemiology),
available at http://www.cste.org/pdffiles/ecacoverl.pdf; P'SHIP FOR PUB. SERV., HOMELAND
INSECURITY: BUnDING THE EXPERTISE TO DEFEND AMERiCA FROM BIOTERRORiSM (2003)
(discussing the deficiencies in retaining and attracting a skilled biodefense workforce at federal
government agencies).
156. Infectious Disease Outbreaks Hearing, supra note 143, at 7.
157. See also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITEES:
BIOTERRORISM: PREPAREDNESS VARIED ACROSS STATE AND LOCAL JURISDICTIONS (2003)
(discussing the results of site visits to seven cities to analyze their preparedness to respond to a
bioterrorist attack).
158. See Infectious Disease Outbreaks Hearing, supra note 143, at 8.
159. Id. at 13.
160. Id. at 14.
161. The CDC notes "the importance of continuing to build a strong public health
infrastructure at all levels of government in order to mount a rapid and effective response to public
health emergencies and develop sustainable disease prevention strategies." CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PROGRAM IN BRIEF: INFECTIOUS
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After September 1 Ith and the subsequent anthrax outbreak, the risk of
bioterrorism became more salient to federal and state governments. The
White House's budget for fiscal year 2003 proposed to spend $1.2 billion
to increase the capacity of state and local health delivery systems to
respond to bioterrorism.'62 The budget for the CDC's Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Cooperative Agreement Program increased
more than ten-fold. 6 3 Despite the increases, the public health
infrastructure remains weak. Most resources in the President's budget are
devoted to biomedical research and health care delivery rather than the
public health system.' Further, the current state budget crisis threatens to
undermine governmental services.
E. Crossing a Threshold: The Risk Warrants a Liberty-
Limiting Response
Given that biological weapons are economical and relatively easy to
develop, they pose a risk to the American public. The portability,
inexpense, lethality, and low risk of detection make developing a disease
as an agent of terrorism attractive to groups determined to disrupt our way
of life. The fact that many countries have already developed agents for
bioterrorism is further evidence of their attractiveness. Adding to the risk
is the fact that non-state actors have expressed the interest, if not yet the
unfettered ability, to develop their own weapons. The risk has, in at least
two cases, developed into a reality on American soil.'65 Finally, the tipping
point in a risk analysis is the severe harm to population health and the
economy that would occur if a successful large-scale attack was carried
out.
DISEASES, available at http://www.cdc.gov/programs/infect5.pdf (last visited Feb. 2003).
162. PRESIDENT'S 2003 BUDGET, supra note 34, at 19.
163. JANET REHNQUIST, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
STATE AND LOCAL BIOTERRORiSM PREPAREDNESS 15 (2002). The CDC's cooperative program
increased from $66.7 million in 2001 to $918 million in 2002. Id. In February 2002, a new $125
million cooperative program with state health departments to upgrade hospital preparedness was
announced. Id.
164. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Conceptualizing the Field After September 11 th: Foreword to
a Symposium on Public Health Law, 90 KY. L.J. 791, 797 (2002). But see Ali S. Khan & David A.
Ashford, Ready or Not-Preparedness for Bioterrorism, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 287, 289 (2001)
(editorial) ("[Flederal funds for public health are not reaching the health care community, even
though we all recognize the central part that physicians, associated health care providers, and acute
care hospitals would play during a bioterrorist attack."); Ann McFeatters, Some Health Programs
Suffer in Budget, PrIrSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 6, 2002, at A6 (noting that the President's
budget beefs up the public health system to respond to bioterrorism at the expense of other health
agencies such as the CDC).
165. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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Given the evidence, it is reasonable to suggest that a threshold has been
crossed justifying consideration of a liberty-limiting response to avert the
risk or ameliorate the harm. Historically, infectious disease control has
included measures that restrict personal privacy (e.g., surveillance), bodily
integrity (e.g., vaccination and treatment), and liberty (e.g., quarantine).166
So too has government fettered the free exercise of property rights by, for
example, seizure, closure, or destruction of private property or licensing
and credentialing of professionals and institutions. 167
The fact that liberty-limiting powers are warranted still does not answer
the question of how to make the hard trade-offs between personal and
economic liberty on the one hand, and national health and security on the
other. In the context of the homeland security project, we face difficult
decisions. Both liberty and economic freedom are central to our society.
Yet, these freedoms have never been absolute. Both kinds of rights, civil
and economic, need reconsideration in the new context of contemporary
health threats.
II. RISK REGULATION AND STATE POWER: ASKING THE
RIGHT QUESTION
In response to the risk analysis just presented, federal and state
governments have sought to introduce a variety of state powers designed
to prevent, detect, and respond to bioterrorism. 68 The powers needed to
address bioterrorism relate to planning, surveillance, and restrictions on
personal and proprietary freedoms.'69 These are the powers authorized
under the MSEHPA, supported by federal and state officials. 71 Several,
but not all, of the powers established under the Model Act entail
limitations on personal or proprietary interests.1
7
'
Planning provisions would put in place a process for thinking through
each of the factors necessary for public health preparedness. A thoughtful
strategic design must include: the actors (e.g., law enforcement, public
166. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., MSEHPA, supra note 8.
169. See sources cited supra note 11.
170. Id. The Secretary for Health and Human Services (HHS) and the CDC have urged states
to ensure that they have the powers identified in the MSEHPA to prepare for, and respond to, a
public health emergency. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Statement by
HHS Secretary Tommy G. Thompson Regarding the Model Emergency Health Powers Act, (Oct.
30, 2001), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2001pres/20011030.html. The National
Conference of State Legislatures has prepared a "checklist" of powers based on MSEHPA for
consideration of the states. LISA SPEISSEGGER & CHERYL RUNYON, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT: A CHECKLIST OF ISSUES
(2002).
17 1. See sources cited supra notes 8 and 11.
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health, and emergency management); decisionmaking processes;
communication networks; contingency plans, like procurement and
deployment of supplies (e.g., vaccines, pharmaceuticals and hospital
beds); licensing of health-care professionals; destruction or seizure of
dangerous property; and safe disposal of human remains.
Surveillance provisions would authorize measures for early
identification of a public health emergency. The two principal forms of
surveillance are passive and active.' Passive surveillance includes case
reporting-mandatory duties on health-care professionals and laboratories
to report patients with conditions of public health importance.'73 Case
reporting usually entails disclosure of a person's name and other
identifying characteristics to the health department; 74 consequently, there
is an invasion of privacy. 75
Active surveillance includes powers to monitor health data to identify
abnormal patterns suggestive of a public health emergency.'76 For
example, agencies are interested in unusual clusters of gastrointestinal or
respiratory disease in emergency rooms or managed-care organizations,
inordinately large numbers of sales of anti-diarrhea medications in
pharmacies, or sharp increases in absences from schools or workplaces.'77
Active surveillance may, or may not, include personal identifiers.'78
Although anonymous data are often sufficiently informative, in some cases
health officials need personal identifiers to accurately track cases and
avoid duplications. Surveillance, like intelligence in the criminal justice
context, offers an early warning system essential for rapid identification
and response to threats. At the same time, it invades a sphere of personal
172. For a discussion on surveillance, see Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., supra note 9, at 82-83.
See also Karen H. Rothenberg, The AIDS Project: Creating A Public Health Policy-Rights and
Obligations of Health Care Workers, 48 MD. L. REV. 93, 211 n.374 (1989).
173. Id.
174. For a discussion of reporting and the trade-offs between public health and informational
privacy, see GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW, supra note 2, at 116-2 1. Some reporting statutes do not
require names, but may use unique identifiers, which arguably is less invasive of privacy, but also
possibly less effective. See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., National HIV Case Reporting for the
United States: A Defining Moment in the History of the Epidemic, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1162,
1162-67 (1997); Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., The "Names Debate": The Case for
National HIV Reporting in the United States, 61 ALBANY L. REV. 679 (1998).
175. Privacy invasions occur only if the health record contains personally identifiable
information. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 451, 519-
20(1995).
176. See sources cited supra note 172.
177. LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW POWER, DUTY AND RESTRAINT 94, 116-17
(2000) (noting, for example, that surveillance indicating clusters of "unusual pneumonia and rare
cancers among gay men" ultimately lead to the identification of AIDS).
178. See sources cited supra note 172.
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privacy by disclosing identifiable patient records to government health
agencies.
Provisions for personal restrictions would follow traditional
communicable disease control measures designed to secure prophylaxis
against disease, reduced infectiousness, and/or behavioral change to
prevent transmission. Classic interventions include: (1) vaccination to
avert infection or ease its effects, which infringes on bodily integrity and
perhaps freedom of conscience or religion; (2) testing and physical
examination to identify persons exposed or infected, which implicate
informational privacy interests; (3) medical treatment to alleviate
symptoms and decrease infectiousness, which invades bodily integrity;
and (4) quarantine to separate the ill from the healthy, which infringes on
freedom of movement and association.'
Provisions for property restrictions would similarly follow standard
sanitary regulations designed to diminish dangerous conditions; procure
goods and services for public health uses; and assure availability and
quality in health-care professions and institutions. Archetypical measures
include: (1) nuisance abatements, which interfere with free enterprise and
freedom of contract; (2) seizure and destruction of hazardous materials,
which infringe on property rights; (3) licensing of professionals and
credentialing of health-care facilities, which effect professional and
business pursuits; and (4) taking property for public uses, which affects
property rights and free enterprise."'
Critics from both ends of the political spectrum stridently oppose the
exercise of many of these powers.' Liberty-limiting state power, they
suggest, lacks justification in a liberal democracy, with its emphasis on
individualism and free agency. 2 More specifically, civil libertarians
express a preference for personal freedoms of autonomous rights-bearing
individuals-the right to privacy, bodily integrity, and free travel.8 3
Economic libertarians express a preference for economic freedoms of
entrepreneurs-free enterprise, competitive markets, freedom to contract,
and professional and business pursuits.' Often, critics frame their
arguments in absolute terms (the state ought not have power over
individuals) rather than in relative terms (the state should have power only
in clearly specified circumstances).
179. See generally GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW, supra note 2, at 113-234.
180. Id. at 237-305. Unlike the other regulatory interventions mentioned, the taking private
property for a public use does require just compensation under the Takings Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
181. See notes 216-24 infra and accompanying text.
182. Id.
183. See notes 216-38 infra and accompanying text.
184. See notes 239-59 infra and accompanying text.
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How seriously should we take these kinds of argument leveled against
the introduction of state power? Is there any reason to conclude that the
powers I have just enumerated are irrational under prevailing theories of
political philosophy or other forms of rigorous scholarly thought? The
answer, of course, depends on the rationale for the exercise of power and
the particular power sought. When deciding whether to intervene, the
government must first assess the risk to the population, and then determine
the means by which the risk can be managed. These two dimensions-the
level of risk and the means adopted-are important in determining the
legitimacy of the government action.
On the first dimension (level of risk), multiple threats exist, each with
a different risk calculation. Assessing risk is not a simple task; it requires,
inter alia, an understanding of the nature and probability of the risk and
the severity of harm should the risk materialize."8 5 The three risk
categories presented below use simplifying assumptions designed to
identify clear cases where state intervention is, or is not, justified, together
with an illustration of a hard case involving complex trade-offs. The three
risk categories are not mutually exclusive, but represent points on a
continuum (see Table "Risk Categories").
Significant risk: An agency limits liberty to avert a reasonably tangible
and immediate prospect of harm. The government has detailed
knowledge of the nature of the risk (e.g., the pathogen and its modes
of transmission), the probability (the chances that the threat will result
in harm), and the duration (the period during which the threat persists).
Additionally, the state can identify a risk producer (the actor who poses
the risk) and the at-risk population (the people who are likely to be
harmed).
Consider the following illustration of an agency action to avert a
significant risk. The public health authority orders the compulsory
vaccination, treatment, or quarantine of a currently contagious
individual who poses a risk of transmission of a harmful disease such
as smallpox. The nature of the risk would be known (transmission of
smallpox), as would the probability and timing. The risk producer is
known (the infected person), as is the population that is endangered
(the contacts of the infected person). Such action would be
immediately necessary to avert a significant risk of harm, but would
infringe on individual rights to liberty and bodily integrity.
185. See, e.g., Sch. Bd. ofNassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,287-89 (1987) (examining
the nature, duration, probability, and severity of the risk in the context of infectious diseases). Risk
assessment, of course, is highly complex, raising important problems of risk characterization, risk
communication, and risk perception. For a more complete examination of risk assessment and its
complexities, see GOsTIN, PUBLIC HEALTh LAW, supra note 2, at 93-99.
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Alternatively, the agency orders the abatement of a nuisance for
businesses that conduct hazardous activities or possess dangerous
property. Consider an agency decision to destroy a rug infested with
smallpox virus or de-contaminate a building containing anthrax spores.
Such action would be immediately necessary to protect the public's
health, but would deprive the business of property without just
compensation. 8 6 In these illustrations, much is known about the nature
and likelihood of the risk and the potential harm if the threat is left
unchecked.
Moderate risk: An agency limits liberty in an environment of increased
population risk (e.g., a "code orange" alert). It acts with evidence of
heightened risk and has clear goals of identifying and responding to
hazards. In situations of moderate risk, the government has less
specific information upon which to act. It is known that the general
population is at risk, but which segments of the population would be
targeted or endangered is not known. In addition, little is known about
the precise nature, probability, and timing of the risk.
Consider an agency decision to monitor all emergency rooms to
identify unusual clusters of infectious disease cases. The monitoring
affords the agency an early warning system to detect disease outbreaks,
but does not avert a known, immediate harm. The agency infringes on
the right to informational privacy by reviewing patient records.
Alternatively, the agency conducts routine administrative inspections
of high-risk businesses. Consider an agency decision to inspect the
relevant activities and records of private laboratories or pharmaceutical
companies engaged in research on pathogens capable of being used as
biological weapons. The monitoring may prevent the wrongful use or
transfer of potential agents of bioterrorism, but the regulation may be
burdensome, affecting the businesses' freedom of enterprise.
Negligible risk (arbitrarily exercised): An agency limits liberty
capriciously without clear evidence of heightened risk or clear goals.
In this category, the risk to the population is known to be low.
Moreover, there is no reasonable suspicion based on an individualized
assessment that the target of agency action poses a threat. Rather, the
agency acts based on generalized or exaggerated fears.
186. Classically, the exercise of police powers like a nuisance abatement is not a "taking" and,
therefore, does not require compensation under the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 417 (1922) ("As long recognized some values are enjoyed under an
implied limitation and must yield to the police power."). On the more complicated issue of
regulatory takings, see generally GOSTiN, PUBuC HEALTH LAW, supra note 2, at 263-65; Richard
J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct "Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1411 (1993).
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Consider an agency decision to compulsorily vaccinate, treat, or
isolate individuals without clear evidence of infection or exposure to
infection. Alternatively, consider an agency decision to wiretap the
telephone calls and monitor the e-mail communications of health care
institutions and professionals without individualized evidence of risk.
The agency action lacks justification because the population risk is low
and the target of the intervention does not pose a known threat.
Risk Categories*
Risk Level Elements of Risk Illustrations Agency Action
Assessment Acceptable?
Significant -Nature and • Ordering Yes
An agency limits liberty to probability of the vaccination, treatment,
avert a tangible and risk--known or quarantine for
immediate prospect of harm *-Risk producer- currently contagious
known individuals who pose
-At risk population- a risk of transmission.
known -Destroying a rug
infested with
smallpox.
Moderate -Nature, probability, .Engaging in active Hard tradeoffs
An agency limits liberty in and timing of surveillance through between
an environment of increased risk---unknown collection and analysis individual and
population risk *At risk of identifiable health collective
population-unknown information of private interests
health care providers.
-Routine inspection of
high-risk businesses.
Negligible -Population risk-low -Conducting a No
An agency limits liberty suspicionless search of
capriciously without clear personal or business
evidence of heightened risk records.
-Routinely sharing
health information
with law enforcement.
• Government Interventions: Significant and moderate risk categories assume will-targeted means. Means that
exceed the scope of the threat or use public health as a pretext for discrimination are unacceptable regardless
of risk category.
The second dimension is the means used to avert the threat. Of course,
the government has a number of powers that can be used to minimize the
effects of a threat. The government could quarantine, isolate, vaccinate,
physically examine, require medical treatment, inspect businesses, destroy
private property, or take private property for public uses. The power
sought can vary in terms of which individual interests are affected, to what
degree, and with what level of effectiveness. Rough descriptions of the
extremes of governmental intervention can be constructed. These
intervention categories represent the ends of a spectrum:
20031
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" Well-Targeted Intervention: An agency action is most appropriate if it
is well-targeted in the following ways. First, the agency acts with the
pure intention of mitigating risk. Second, the action is actually likely
to mitigate the risk. Third, the action is well-tailored so that it is not
unreasonably over- or under-inclusive. Finally, the action is the least
restrictive necessary to achieve the state's legitimate goals. Consider
a government decision to require directly observed therapy for multi-
drug resistant tuberculosis (M.TB). 87 The agency appears to act with
the intention of benefiting the person and preventing transmission of
M.TB infection; the treatment is likely to achieve these goals; the
treatment is well-tailored; and it is the least restrictive intervention
under the circumstances.
" Arbitrary, Excessive, or Pretextual Intervention: Government action is
least appropriate if it restricts individual interests in a way that exceeds
the scope of the threat or uses public health as a pretext for
discrimination. The agency may over reach by interfering with liberty
more than necessary to achieve legitimate goals, or by using a
significant risk as a pretext for action that is not directed toward
mitigating the risk. For example, the agency may conduct a fishing
expedition of personal or business records, freely sharing data with law
enforcement, immigration, and other government officials. Worse still,
the agency may act based on stereotypes or animus of individuals or
groups based on their race, religion, or ethnicity. Consider an agency
decision to quarantine all members of a particular ethnic group, but not
other similarly situated ethnic group members, in a given geographic
area. This action would be arbitrary, perhaps based on exaggerated fear
or even animus, and would not be necessary to detect or respond to a
public health emergency.
187. Directly observed therapy is a compliance-enhancing strategy in which each dose of
medication is observed by a family member, peer advocate, community worker, or health care
professional. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF
TUBERCULOSIS 27, 89 (1993); see also Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Resurgent Tuberculosis Epidemic
in the Era ofAIDS: Reflections on Public Health, Law, and Society, 54 MD. L. REV. 1, 124 (1995).
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Means-End Categories
1139
Means Elements Illustrations Agency Action
Acceptable?
Well-Targeted -Agency acts with -Requiring directly
Intervention intention to mitigate observed therapy for
risk patients with multi-
-Governmental action drug resistant Yes
is likely to mitigate tuberculosis
risk
-Action is well tailored
-Action is the least
restrictive necessary
Arbitrary, Excessive, -Government -Conducting a fishing
or Pretextual intervention restricts expedition of personal
Intervention liberty in a way that records, freely sharing
exceeds the scope of data with law
the threat enforcement No
-Government uses
public health as a .Quarantining
pretext for members of an ethnic
discrimination or religious group, but
not others similarly
situated.
The risk dimension and the means-ends dimension are interwoven. In
any given case, the legitimacy of government action depends on the risk
posed and the means used to diminish the risk. The state acts at its highest
level of legitimacy when the risk is significant and the means well-
targeted. The state acts at its lowest level of legitimacy when the risk is
low and the means are ill-suited to achieve legitimate ends. It is important
to stress that even in high-risk settings, means that exceed the scope of the
threat or use public health as a pretext for discrimination are unacceptable.
My principal argument is that the state's claim to possess appropriate
liberty-limiting power is unmistakably valid for certain risk categories,
assuming the proposed intervention is well targeted. In the significant risk
hypothetical, I intend to demonstrate that mainstream political theories
support the exercise of appropriate authority."'8 No hard choices are
presented because the state restricts freedom of action to avert a tangible
harm. 18
9
For the moderate risk category, the state's claim does present a harder
problem, even if the governmental intervention is well-targeted. In the
moderate risk hypothetical, critics have at least aprimafacie case that the
state should not possess liberty-limiting power. Hard choices are required
188. As mentioned, police powers exercised to avert a significant risk are also supported by
historical practice and constitutional analysis. See sources cited supra note 9.
189. On the other hand, even significant risk does not justify an inappropriate governmental
use of power.
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because this kind of case places in conflict alternative values---one
preferring personal liberties and the other public goods. Here, I will
suggest that, since two sets of values collide, it is necessary to take a
position preferring one value over another or, at least, to weigh one value
more heavily in constructing a public policy. Still, I will not accede to the
prevalent liberal view of the unwavering primacy of the individual, but
argue that individualism needs to be balanced against equally valid ideals
of community safety.
For still other risk categories, the state's claim is almost certainly
invalid. In the negligible risk or arbitrary action hypothetical, no liberty-
limiting state power is permissible. This kind of intervention finds little
support in serious political-philosophical traditions because it violates
basic tenets of liberalism (e.g., freedom and fairness) while failing to
substantially advance any collective interest in health and security.
Although illustrations of the exercise of authority against ethnic or
religious groups can be found in American history, the courts often
repudiate them as an abuse of power.'90
It should be clear when examining these scenarios that commentators
often ask the wrong question when inquiring about the appropriate scope
of state authority in a public health emergency. They ask whether the law
should afford public health authorities the power to limit the freedoms of
individuals and businesses. 9' Indeed, the journals, newspapers, and
Internet are replete with claims that no legal authority should exist to
vaccinate, treat, and quarantine individuals, or to abate nuisances, seize
property, or take property for public uses.'92 These arguments purport to
apply, without differentiation, to all risk categories described above.
However, as I will demonstrate, the significant risk scenario unequivocally
justifies the exercise of appropriate state power, and the moderate risk
category arguably justifies limits on individual interests. The argument
190. See the judicial repudiation of police powers against Chinese Americans at the turn of
the 20th century discussed in notes 260-64 infra and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., Annas, supra note 5.
192. These arguments manifest themselves in critiques of the Model Act. See, e.g., id. at 1341
(suggesting that the Model Act unnecessarily sacrifices civil liberties in the name of public health);
Wendy Mariner, The Wrong Response, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 17, 2001, at A20; Jason Mercier,
Evergreen Freedom Found., Emergency Health Powers Act Threatens Liberty, (Jan. 2, 2002), at
http://www.effwa.org/opeds/2002_01 02.php; AAPSAnalysis: Model Emergency Health Powers
Act (MEHPA) Turns Governors Into Dictators, Ass'n of Am. Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. (Dec.
3, 2001), (describing the Model Act as a prescription for tyranny), at
http://www.aapsonline.org/testimony/emerpower.htm lhereinafterAAPSAnalysis]; Press Release,
Tetrahedron, CDC Advances Totalitarian Legislation Under Guise of 'Public Health': Forced
Drugging and Injections Are On the Horizon (Nov. 9, 2001), at
http:www.tetrahedron.org/news/NROI I 109.html.
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that law ought not afford liberty-limiting powers to public health agencies
finds no support in philosophical tradition, history, or constitutional law.
The central inquiry, then, is not whether government should have the
power to act. It is overly simplified to suggest, as critics do, that liberty is
always preferable to public health or that voluntarism is always preferable
to coercion. Rather, the proper inquiry is under what circumstances power
can be exercised-the standards, processes, and safeguards that fetter, but
do not obviate, government power. By setting precise standards and
requiring sound fact-finding procedures, the law seeks to differentiate
between the valid and unjustified use of authority.
In the following part, I examine public health powers through the lens
of political theory, principally liberalism and communitarianism. This
assessment will demonstrate that liberty-limiting state power is justified
at least in some cases. My inquiry ends with an examination of the
conditions in which power should be exercised. This is far from an easy
task because any framework is necessarily influenced by personal choice
and political ideology.
III. POLITICAL THEORY: LIBERAL AND COMMUNITARIAN RESPONSES
TO LIBERTY-LIMITING STATE POWER
My purpose in this part is to demonstrate that prevailing theories of
political philosophy support the exercise of liberty-limiting state power
under certain circumstances. Those expressing extreme viewpoints imply
that any exercise of public health power is unwarranted. Yet, they rely on
assertion rather than on established political or social theory.'93
A. Liberal Theory
Liberalism has become the de facto political philosophy in late
twentieth and early twenty-first century America. 94 Liberalism is, in some
ways, a rejoinder to utilitarianism.'95 Liberals prefer a normative focus on
193. See, e.g., Annas, supra note 5.
194. Kevin P. Quinn, Viewing Health Care as a Common Good: Looking Beyond Political
Liberalism, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 290 (2000).
195. See, e.g., RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SEIOUSLY 94-96(1977) (suggesting that
rights are not rights at all if they can be trumped by consequential goals); ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 149 (1974) (defending the ideal of a minimalist state and
unencumbered individual freedom); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 30 (1971) (setting forth
a theory of justice that does not rely on consequences, but maintains that although his theory
"characterize[s] the rightness of institutions and acts independently from their consequences...
[aill ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness").
However, not all liberal theorists reject utilitarianism. Indeed, some theorists use utilitarian
reasoning to support liberal ideas. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 68 (Gertrude
Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1974) (1859).
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personal autonomy and reject the utilitarian ideal of weighing benefits and
burdens. 6 Respect for the individual in the Kantian tradition' demands
a strong sphere of personal sovereignty. 9 ' Each autonomous individual is
perceived as having an interest in self-direction, shaped by her own desires
and preferences. 99 This individual interest deserves respect, meaning that
persons should be entitled to pursue their goals without external
hindrances.2 "°
While liberalism's true core is autonomy, it also encompasses the value
of pluralism.20' Liberal pluralism recognizes that individuals have different
conceptions of a satisfying life and that each conception deserves equal
respect."' According to liberal theory, government should remain neutral
about the meaning of a good life, allowing individuals a private sphere to
choose among their different conceptions.2 3 Freedom to implement these
choices by engaging in personal and economic activities, then, becomes
a hallmark of liberal theory. °"
Liberalism, of course, is not a single, fixed set of values, but a
spectrum ranging from libertarianism to egalitarianism.0" Libertarianism,
196. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TOTHE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., Hafner Press 1948) (1789).
197. Immanuel Kant's theory is often referred to as deontological because it holds that "certain
features of action other than or in addition to consequences make actions right or wrong." TOM L.
BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 348-49 (5th ed. 2001).
Kant held that moral obligation is determined by rules. Id. at 349-50. One such rule or maxim is
to "[a]ct so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an
end and never as a means only." IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS AND WHAT IS ENLIGHTENMENT? 47 (Lewis White Beck trans., Macmillan 1959) (1785).
198. Kant, supra note 197, at 70-73. The word "autonomy" literally means self-governance
(the Greek autos or "self' and nomos or "law," "rule," or "governance"). See THE OXFORD
CLASSiCALDICTIONARY 224 (Simon Homblower & Antony Spawforth eds., 3d ed. 1996). It is what
one makes of one's own life. Autonomy refers to an interest in self direction or freedom of will in
the Kantian doctrine. See id.; see generally Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and
Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1705 (1992).
199. See generally Winick, supra note 198.
200. See generally id.
201. Quinn, supra note 194, at 289-90 (citing JOHN KEKEs, AGAINST LIBERALISM 6-15
(1997)).
202. JOHN KEKEs, AGAINST LIBERAUSM 6 (1997).
203. See DAVID JOHNSTON, THE IDEA OF A LIBERAL THEORY 24-26 (1994).
204. KEKES, supra note 202, at 12 ("This is the liberalism of Mill... Berlin... Friedrich
Hayek... and Robert Nozick... among others.").
205. See id. at 12-13. Egalitarians, while adhering to ideals of freedom, also see individuals
as deserving fundamental goods needed for living according to any conception of a good life. See
id. at 14. These goods include the bare necessities of life like food, shelter, and health care. See id.
at 13. The state, under egalitarian understandings, should afford welfare rights to individuals. See
id. These rights, moreover, should be justly distributed among the population-for example,
distributed based on need. See RAWLS, supra note 195, at 60-61.
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a form of "hard" liberalism, holds that respect for individuals is at the
heart of a free society.2"6 Libertarians see personal freedom, civil and
economic, as critical to personal well-being and societal functioning." 7
They insist on near unfettered liberty to act and to resist state
intervention.2 8  Government's role, according to libertarian
understandings, is to afford maximal levels of political and social space to
facilitate individual action.209
In most political discourse, libertarianism of the ideological left (i.e.,
civil libertarianism) and the ideological right (i.e., economic
libertarianism) are seen as diametric opposites.2" ° Yet, civil and economic
libertarians, in certain ways, look more alike than dissimilar. Each side of
the political spectrum stresses individual freedom: civil libertarians prefer
freedom of personal action (e.g., bodily integrity, informational privacy,
and freedom of movement and association), while economic libertarians
prefer freedom of enterprise (e.g., freedom to contract, use property, and
engage in business activities).2"
The libertarian critique is notable for its characterization of personal
interests as "rights," with its exaggerated absoluteness, its
hyperindividualism, its insularity, and its silence with respect to personal,
civic, and collective responsibilities." 2 It is distinctly anti-government and
anti-regulation in tone.23  Government is viewed as pondering,
I shall now state in a provisional form the two principles ofjustice that I believe
would be chosen in the original position.... First: each person is to have an equal
right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty to others.
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both
(a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to
positions and offices open to all.
Id. For egalitarians, government's responsibility to afford people a certain level of health and
security is foundationally important because these goods are necessary for the exercise of civil and
political rights. NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE 17 (1985) ("Even in the US, which has a
much less egalitarian health-care system than many other industrialized capitalist or socialist
countries, there is the belief that health care should be distributed more equally than many other
social goods.").
206. See generally DAVID BOAZ, LIBERTARIANISM: A PRIMER 59-93 (1997) (enumerating the
many rights with which libertarians believe government may not interfere).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See Gostin, Public Health Law in the Age of Terrorism, supra note 11, at 80.
211. See id.
212. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF PoLmcAL DISCOURSE
109(1991).
213. Gostin, Public Health Law in the Age of Terrorism, supra note 11, at 80.
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bureaucratic, and inefficient.2"4 In addition, state regulation and taxation
are seen as burdensome and excessively meddlesome.215
Not surprisingly, the predominant critique of emergency health powers
comes from the libertarian perspective.2 6 While the libertarian critique
does not always deny the need to attend to the public interest, it insists that
any diminution of individual rights must be so encumbered with
demanding standards and rigorous process that it effectively thwarts the
exercise of power.2 7
Some hard liberals go further, claiming that coercion is virtually never
appropriate to achieve public health goals.2t8 They argue, inter alia, that
individuals have "fundamental rights" to refuse physical interventions
such as testing, medical examinations, vaccination, and treatment;
21 9
restrictions on liberty like isolation and quarantine are unnecessary.22 °
These libertarians claim that voluntariness is virtually always preferable
to coercion and that "trade-offs" between personal rights and common
goods are not required.22" ' They support these claims normatively, based on
the inherent right to personal dignity, and instrumentally, based on an
assertion that coercion sends an epidemic underground, so that people
avoid health care and public health professionals.222
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. For an account of the major critiques of emergency health legislation and a response to
these critiques, see id. (discussing the libertarian claims of federalism, triggering a public health
emergency, and abuse of government power).
217. See Amitai Etzioni, Public Health Law: A Communitarian Perspective, 21 HEALTH AFF.
102 (2002):
Although [liberals] do not deny the need to attend to the public interest (which
courts often define as attending to public safety and to public health), they demand
that any diminution of rights, as they define them, must pass numerous tests to
show that there is indeed a need to so act.
Id.
218. See, e.g., Annas, supra note 13.
219. See, e.g., id. at 96 ("'[l]ndividuals have a fundamental right to refuse medical treatment,
testing, physical or mental examination, vaccination, participation in experimental procedures and
protocols, collection of specimens and preventative treatment programs."') (quoting 2002 Minn.
Laws 402).
220. See Annas, supra note 5, at 1339.
221. See, e.g., id. at 1339-40 ("[Tlhe argument that, in a public health emergency, there must
be a trade-off between effective public health measures and civil rights is simply wrong."); Annas,
supra note 13, at 97 ("Ultimately, public health must rely not on force but on persuasion. .. ");
Mariner, supra note 192 (noting that no force was needed to ensure that those exposed to anthrax
began taking the antibiotic Cipro).
222. See, e.g., Annas, supra note 13, at 96 (stating that the prospect of compulsion "would
rightly engender distrust in government and public heath officials and could actually discourage
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Libertarians characterize emergency health powers in provocative,
sensational ways to stir controversy-describing the Model Act223 as a
prescription for tyranny that "turns governors into dictators," permitting
them to "create a police state by fiat. 224 Although the Model Act has
221many supporters, the media and journals give libertarian views a certain
salience, perhaps believing that audiences prefer simplified dichotomies
rather than nuanced argument.226
Despite the critics' strident arguments, a more careful examination
shows that liberal theory (perhaps except in its most extreme forms) would
actually support liberty-limiting state power. 227 Most liberals agree with
public health powers narrowly tailored to avert a significant risk of harm.
Support for this position, moreover, would come from both the ideological
left and ideological right.
1. Civil Libertarian Conceptions of Risk: The Harm Principle
At first glance, liberals would be expected to oppose liberty-limiting
state power. After all, public health powers encroach on some of the most
fundamental civil liberties such as privacy, bodily integrity, and freedom
of movement, association, and religion. Sanitary regulations similarly
violate basic economic liberties such as freedom of contract, pursuit of
professional status, use of private property, and competitive markets.
However, liberalism, properly conceived, would support state power to
avert a significant risk of harm; and liberals may not even be adverse to
action to avert a moderate risk.
those who might have been exposed from seeking treatment at all-even encourage them to escape
to another state").
223. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
224. Ass'n of Am. Physicians and Surgeons, Inc., supra note 192. AAPS characterizes itself
as a libertarian organization.
225. As of February 1,2002, twenty-one states (Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin)
and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation influenced by the Model Act. See Shenna
Bradshaw, Note, Quarantined: Is Missouri Prepared to Sacrifice Some of Its Constitutional
Freedoms to Ensure Public Health Safety in an Outbreak?, 71 U. Mo.-KAN. CiTYL. REv. 939,947
(2003); see also Justin Gillis, States Weighing Laws to Fight Bioterrorism, WASH. POST, Nov. 19,
2001, at AI (discussing the antiquated nature of existing state public health laws).
226. Historians from Columbia University, for example, have traced the extreme libertarian
views associated with MSEHPA. Bayer & Colgrove, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and the Law,
supra note 13; Bayer & Colgrove, Public Health vs. Civil Liberties, supra note 13; Sarah Lueck,
States Seek to Strengthen Emergency Powers-Movement Is Raising Privacy and Civil-Liberties
Concerns, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2002, at A26.
227. See, e.g., Thaddeas Mason Pope, Balancing Public Health Against Individual Liberty:
The Ethics of Smoking Regulations, 61 U. Prrr. L. REv. 419, 431 (2000).
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Liberal philosophers focus their attention primarily on limiting
regulation of self-regarding behavior.22 They believe the state has no
warrant for interfering with behavior that affects primarily the individual
herself.29 Consequently, liberals reject public health paternalism in the
form of, say, regulation of motorcycle helmets, seatbelts, and water
fluoridation. 3 They are especially critical of the "new" public health, with
its emphasis on the prevention of behaviors causing chronic disease-e.g.,
cigarette smoking, consumption of high fat foods, and unsafe sex.23' These
behaviors, according to liberal philosophy, belong in the private
(unregulated) sphere because they do not affect others;232 autonomous
individuals, under this account, are responsible for their personal choices.
Although liberals condemn paternalism, they have traditionally
acknowledged the legitimacy of state power where necessary to avert a
significant risk of harm to others.233 Classic liberal philosophers from John
228. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 8-9 (1986), cited in Pope, supra note 227, at 498
n.8; see also Henry Mather, Natural Law and Liberalism, 52 S.C. L. REV. 331, 335 (2001)
(discussing a common theme among liberals that paternalistic laws can seldom be justified).
229. See, e.g., Mather, supra note 228, at 335.
230. Philip Cole, The Moral Bases for Public Health Interventions, 6 EPIDEMIOLOGY 78
(1995).
231. See SALLY SATEL, How POLITICAL CORRECTNESS IS CORRUPTING MEDICINE (2002);
Miquel A. Faria, Jr., Public Health-From Science to Politics, 6 MED. SENTINEL 46, 46-49 (2001);
Sally Satel & Theodore R. Marmor, Does Inequality Make You Sick?: The Dangers of the New
Public Health Crusade, WKLY. STANDARD, July 16,2001, at 18; Sally Satel, The Indoctrinologists
Are Coming, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 2001, at 59; Jacob Sullum, The Tyranny ofPublic Health,
4 MED. SENTINEL 100, 100-02 (1999).
232. MILL, supra note 195, at 68-69. Mill argues that, subject to background duties ofjustice
and fair contribution, state coercion is justified only to prevent or punish acts causing harms to
other persons, not harms to self. Id. Harm to others can be found in almost any type of behavior;
indirect harm is subject to limitless expansion. Those who support apparently paternalistic policies
often identify ostensible harms to others, such as financial burdens and social costs associated with
the risk behavior (e.g., costs of emergency response and health care for injuries attributable to
failing to wear a seat belt or motorcycle helmet). See Simon v. Sargent, 346 F. Supp. 277, 279 (D.
Mass. 1972) ("We do not understand a state of mind that permits plaintiff [a motorcyclist] to think
that only he himself is concerned."). Similar ideas are evident in tobacco regulation, which is often
justified by the ostensible harms to third parties from exposure to second hand smoke. See, e.g.,
Pope, supra note 227, at 435-45 (applying the harm principle to smoking regulations).
233. MILL, supra note 195, at 68:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. That
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member
of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
Id. The orthodox jurisprudential analysis of harm is an interest invaded, but there is disagreement
about the scope of the harm that "counts" in applying the harm principle-e.g., moral harms (harms
to character), vicarious harms, on posthumous harms. JOEL FEINBERG, RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE
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Stuart Mill234 to Joel Feinberg,"' argue that, while individual freedom to
engage in self-regarding behavior is near absolute, "other-regarding"
behaviors have distinct limits.236 Known as the "harm principle," liberals
concede the legitimacy of state authority to prevent a significant risk of
harm to others.237
The regulation of infectious disease provides a classic illustration of the
harm principle. Certainly, persons with particular communicable
infections can interact in society with perfect safety. For example, persons
living with HIV/AIDS who do not engage in unprotected sex or needle
sharing pose no appreciable risk. However, if a person behaves in a way
that carries a real risk of transmission of a serious infection, the harm to
others is palpable. Thus, if an autonomous individual engages in behavior
that involves a primary route of disease transmission, unknowing third
BOUNDS OF LIBERTY: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 45 (1980). No one doubts that prevention or
punishment of physical harms, such as contracting an infectious disease, warrants state coercion.
See I JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 31 (1984)
(arguing that the state's primary tools for harm reduction include public health and safety agencies).
234. MILL, supra note 195, at 68-69 (arguing that state coercion is justified only to prevent or
punish acts causing harms to other persons, not harms to self). Many modem liberals disagree with
the inflexibility of the Millian harm principle. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND
MORALITY 30-34 (1963); see also Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle 90, J.
C~iM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109 (1999).
235. FEINBERG, RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDs OF LIBERTY, supra note 233, at 45:
Most writers agree, after all, that the prevention of harms is a legitimate aim of
both the criminal law and the coercive parts of the civil law, though of course
there is much disagreement over whether it is the sole proper concern of coercive
law, over whose harms are properly considered, and over which types of harm
have priority in cases of conflict.
Id. See generally, FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 233.
236. William J. Novak, Private Wealth and Public Health: A Critique of Richard Epstein's
Defense of the "Old" Public Health (forthcoming 2003) (noting the flaws in Mill's harm principle,
which limited public health intervention to where there was a "certainty of danger" to others, as
applied in today's advanced society: "The changed conditions of twentieth-century America
(especially mechanization, concentration, standardization, and corporate organization) demanded
new technologies of social, political, and economic action-a 'renascent liberalism'-if old
individual values were to be realized in new times. Mill's harm principle [was] no longer
enough."); see also JOHN DEWEY, Liberalism and Social Action, in 2 JOHN DEWEY, THE LATER
WORKS, 1925-1953 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1991), cited in Novak, supra note 236 (a "famous
critique" of Mill's harm principle).
237. See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Richard C. Turkington,
Confidentiality Policy for HIV-Related Information: An Analytical Framework for Sorting Out
Hard and Easy Cases, 34 VILL. L. REV. 871, 887-89 (1989) (noting that the interest in avoiding
harm to others is a "reasonable justification for disclosure of HIV-related information [ifl the
recipient of the information is at significant risk of infection and disclosure will significantly reduce
or eliminate that risk").
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parties are affected. Consider the transmission of airborne disease by
entering a crowded place; transmission ofbloodborne disease by engaging
in unprotected sex without disclosure of serological status; or transmission
of foodborne disease by cooks or servers touching patrons' food. In each
case, an autonomous individual's behavior has the potential to cause harm
to others.
Infectious disease regulations targeted toward individuals who pose
risks of tangible and immediate harm to others (as in the significant risk
scenario above) are well within traditional liberal understandings of the
legitimate role of the state.23 Consequently, liberals would be expected to
support liberty-limiting infectious disease control measures (e.g.,
vaccination, physical examination, treatment, and quarantine), at least in
high-risk circumstances.
2. Economic Libertarian Conceptions of Risk: Correcting
Negative Externalities
Economic libertarians also are not adverse to the use of state power to
avert harm to others. Preferring the language of economics, they recognize
the legitimacy of government intervention to correct negative externalities.
An externality occurs when the actions of one person or entity directly
affect the interests of another person or entity in a way that is incidental
to the primary transaction.239 A negative externality is "a spillover" harm
that extends outside the market and affects third parties, often innocent
bystanders. Negative externalities are important in economics because
they are inefficient. Without incentives to consider the effects on others,
there will be external diseconomies-individuals are more likely to engage
in activities where others experience the harms, costs, or burdens.
Industrial pollution that causes nuisance or harm to others provides a
classic illustration of a negative externality.240 Pollution represents an
238. See, e.g., Amy Darby, The Individual, Health Hazardous Lifestyles, Disease and
Liability, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 787, 814-15 (1999) (noting that the harm principle might
support public health paternalism in order to thwart the spread of a contagious disease to the
community).
239. An externality exists whenever an individual's actions affect the well-being of
another-whether beneficial (external economy or positive externality) or harmful (external
diseconomy or negative externality)-in ways that need not be paid for according to the existing
definition of property rights in the society. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 183 (1992)
(stating that an externality "is an effect (beneficial or harmful) that the person creating it will not
take fully into account in deciding whether or how much to engage in the activity that produces it");
R.H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1960); Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem
of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 141 (1979).
240. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian
Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 101-02 (1979) (discussing why public regulation is acceptable
to address the nuisance of air pollution).
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external cost because damages associated with it are borne by society as
a whole and are not reflected in market transactions. It also is possible to
conceptualize activities that transmit infectious disease as producing
external costs. The burdens of behavior posing a risk of disease
transmission are borne by other specific individuals (close contacts or
sexual partners)241 or by the population at large (unspecified individuals
or groups at risk of contracting infection). Individuals have diminished
incentives to reduce risk behaviors because the burdens of unsafe activity
do not affect them directly, but fall primarily on others.
Economists, of course, regard the existence of an externality or other
source of market failure as a necessary rather than sufficient condition for
public intervention.2 42 Intervention is justified on economic grounds only
when it will produce a net increase in social welfare-e.g., the common
law and/or the market could not provide adequate remedies or the
regulation is less burdensome than the external cost.243
Legal economists regard the case of infectious disease as
quintessentially suitable for government regulation.244 Why allow
241. Richard Posner notes, for example, that the concealment of a sexually transmitted disease
from one's sexual partner "is itself a serious form of sexual fraud, properly considered a legal
wrong." POSNER, supra note 239, at 183.
242. See TOMAS J. PHILIPSON & RICHARD A. POSNER, PRIVATE CHOICES AND PUBLIC HEALTH:
THE AIDS EPIDEMIC IN AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 126 (1993).
243. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 107-45 (1985) (analyzing police power); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 276 (2d ed. 1977) (arguing that for direct regulation of safety and health, the
common law and/or the market often provide adequate remedies); Epstein, supra note 240, at 98-
102 (stating that public regulation is justified in the case of air pollution because there is not an
adequate private remedy "given the administrative complications thatthey spawn, even after taking
into account the utilitarian constraints"); Tomas Philipson & Richard A. Posner, Public Spending
on AIDS Education: An Economic Analysis, 37 J.L. & ECoN. 17, 35 (1994) (finding that public
spending on AIDS education may not be justified from an economic perspective because it may
actually lead to an increase in the spread of the disease); see also Jane E. Larson, The New Home
Economics, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 443,450-51 (1993) (reviewing POSNER, supra note 239) (noting
that Richard Posner, a noted economic libertarian, disagrees with social conservatives because,
while he supports public intervention only to correct externalities, he does not consider deviations
from moral norms as externalities).
244. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 239, at 163-64 (stating that infectious diseases cause
externalities sufficient to justify public intervention); Richard A. Epstein, Let the Shoemaker Stick
to His Last: A Defense of the "Old" Public Health, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 5138, 5138 (2003)
[hereinafter Let the Shoemaker Stick to His Last] (observing that the "traditional forms of public
health law were directed largely toward communicable diseases and other externalities, such as
pollution, with negative health impacts"); Richard A. Epstein, Waste and the Dormant Commerce
Clause: A Reprise, 3 GREEN BAG 2d 363, 365 (2000) [hereinafter A Reprise] (expressing that the
"exclusion [of persons with communicable disease] has to be considered as a principled response");
Richard A. Posner, The Cost of Rights: Implications for Central and Eastern Europe-Andfor the
United States, 32 TULSA L.J. 1, 16-19 (1996) (noting that limited public intervention in the form
of government food and water inspections is appropriate to combat food-borne and water-borne
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regulation to control infectious disease and not for other modem public
health problems associated with smoking, diet, and exercise? Private
incentives, like negative health consequences for the individual and higher
health insurance premiums, can be effective deterrents .in the case of
smoking, diet, and exercise. But, in the context of infectious disease, the
theory and practice of private remedies (e.g., voluntary contract,
injunction, and tort actions) break down, making public remedies
attractive.245 Private remedies are unavailable because it is difficult to
identify a wrongdoer to enjoin or sue.246 In most cases, it is unclear who
transmitted the infection.2 47  It is similarly difficult to assign
responsibility-was the act of transmission wrongful or merely unknowing
or inadvertent (as a sneeze)?2 48 Police power regulation holds out the
possibility of increasing security for all at the expense of liberty, but all
people gain from the social exchange.249 People agree to the public
intervention because absent it, they could not take effective steps to
diminish risks common to all.25°
Richard Epstein, a noted economic libertarian, is even prepared to
support quarantine and vaccination in the right circumstance.25 As for
quarantine, he observes, "little can be done to fight [infectious disease] on
a piecemeal basis." '252 It is because individuals do not have adequate
private defensive remedies that public coercion is allowable. The gains to
the safety of countless others so outweighs the restriction of liberty that it
diseases).
245. See Epstein, Let the Shoemaker Stick to His Last, supra note 244, at 5143.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. See Posner, supra note 244, at 16-19. Law and economic scholars are not as convinced
of the suitability of police powers to prevent the spread of HIV and other sexually transmitted
infections because the negative externalities are not as large as generally believed and there exist
private means of protecting against infection. See PI-LIPSON & POSNER, supra note 242, at 126;
POSNER, supra note 239, at 164. Because these diseases are primarily, although not always, spread
through voluntary contact, individuals are more to likely to protect themselves, even without public
intervention. Id. at 163-64. In a similar manner, rational individuals in high-crime areas may also
be likely to take self-protective measures (ranging from installing a home alarm system to owning
a gun) to offset the risks of being a victim of crime. Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, The
Economic Epidemiology of Crime, 39 J.L. & ECON. 405, 407-12 (1996). For a good discussion of
the economics of private protection compared to public intervention to combat crime (without
commenting on the correct balance of private and public intervention), see id.
250. Communitarian theorists would come to a similar conclusion. Michael Walzer reasons
that individuals form political communities primarily for the communal provision of security and
welfare. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY
64 (1983). Public health is the "easy" case of a general communal provision because individuals
acting alone cannot assure their health and safety. Id.
251. Epstein, Let the Shoemaker Stick to His Last, supra note 244, at 5145.
252. Id.
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is "well-nigh impossible to mount a principled categorical attack against
this form of regulation. 253
Vaccination presents a slightly more difficult case for economic
libertarians.254 If vaccination is one hundred percent effective, then
individuals have a readily available method of self-help. Most vaccines,
of course, do not afford perfect protection, so individuals cannot avoid all
risk through voluntary vaccination. Rational individuals, moreover, may
not volunteer for vaccination if they rely on others to do so. The exercise
of police powers, then, may be a justifiable counter to the prisoner's
dilemma255 or to a collective action problem. 256 A rational actor
understands that he incurs less risk if he foregoes vaccination while others
in society submit to it. By doing so, he gains herd immunity2" (assuming
253. Id. Accord Epstein, A Reprise, supra note 244, at 365 ("Exclusion [of persons with
infectious disease] has to be considered as a principled response.").
254. See PHILIPSON & POSNER, supra note 242, at 224 (noting that vaccination "presents a
variety of subtle and neglected economic issues, including the cost of vaccination in lowering
natural immunity and the rapid diminution of its benefits when the prevalence of the disease drops
to extremely low levels" (footnotes omitted)).
255. To understand the prisoner's dilemma, consider what happens when a prosecutor offers
two prisoners a deal in exchange for his/her testimony about the other prisoner. See Steven Kuhn,
Prisoner's Dilemma, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed.,
Winter 2001), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win200l/entries/prisoner-dilemma/
(last modified Oct. 12, 2001). The deal is contingent on one of the prisoners remaining silent. See
id. If both remain silent, the prosecutor will be forced to pursue a lesser charge against both. See
id. If both confess, the prosecutor will recommend an early parole. See id. Regardless of what the
other prisoner does, the prisoner is better off if he confesses than if he remains silent. See id. Yet,
if both prisoners confess, the result is worse than if neither confesses. See id.
256. The collective action problem arises when there is no incentive for persons to individually
contribute to a public good because the public good will be equally available to both contributors
and free-riders. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 2 (1971) (stating "unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small,
or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common
interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests"
(emphasis omitted)). In the case ofvaccination, because there are risks associated with vaccination,
a free-rider may decide to avoid individual risk by foregoing his vaccination while still taking
advantage of others' receipt of vaccination.
257. Herd immunity is an epidemiological concept suggesting that if sufficient numbers of
people in a population are immune from disease, all members of that population are protected. See
Alan R. Hinman et al., ChildhoodImmunization: Laws That Work, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 122, 125
(2002):
If a large enough proportion of individuals in a community is immunized, this
proportion serves as a protective barrier against transmission of the disease in the
community, thus indirectly protecting those who are not immunized for whatever
reason as well as those few who received vaccine but are not protected (vaccine
failures). The proportion of the population that must be immune to provide this
herd immunity varies according to the infectiousness of the agent. For
poliomyelitis, it is considered to be on the order of 80%, whereas for measles it
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others choose to vaccinate) and he avoids risks of vaccine-induced injury.
Affording individuals the right of voluntary choice to vaccination, then, is
not for the greatest good of the community. Rather, as Garrett Hardin
suggests, voluntarism can contribute to a "tragedy of the commons" if too
many people make the decision not to immunize. 8 In this case, all
individuals are better off with legally-enforced, universal coverage than
they would be with insufficient voluntary coverage. 259
3. Liberal Perspectives on the Low Risk, Arbitrary
Action Scenario
Just as liberals (both civil and economic) would support restraints on
liberty to avert a significant risk, so too would they all agree that state
interference is illegitimate in the absence of appreciable risk. Similarly,
liberals would peremptorily reject state power exercised arbitrarily or
discriminatorily. The reasons are straightforward. These interventions
violate core tenets of liberalism and egalitarianism-personal freedom and
fair allocation of burdens. As a result, the negligible-risk category poses
little trouble for liberals because limits on autonomy are not justified by
the need to defend the interests of other persons.
Liberals' antipathy to public health power exercised arbitrarily or
pretextually is understandable, both historically and constitutionally.
Public health agencies have engaged in patently wrongful activity in the
past. During the turn of the twentieth century, for example, public health
officials in San Francisco imposed vaccination and quarantine
requirements that operated exclusively against the Chinese community.260
In the guise of protecting the public's health against bubonic plague,
thousands were deprived of their autonomy and freedom unfairly.261 The
courts saw through the pretext of using public health as a vehicle for
discrimination. 262 Even before the advent of heightened scrutiny, and in an
is in excess of 90%.
Id.
258. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244, 1246 (1968).
259. See Epstein, Let the Shoemaker Stick to His Last, supra note 244, at 5146-47.
260. Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10, 13 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900) (noting that over 10,000 of
the 15,000 persons who resided in the quarantined Chinatown district were Chinese); Wong Wai
v. Williamson, 103 F. 1, 3 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900) (noting that over 25,000 Chinese persons were
subject to the public health measure). See generally MARILYN CHASE, THE BARBARY PLAGUE: THE
BLACK DEATH IN VICTORIAN SAN FRANCISCO (2003); CHARLES J. MCCLAN, IN SEARCH OF
EQUALITY: THE CHINESE STRUGGLE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA
234-76 (1994) (discussing the impact of the plague in Chinatown on the Chinese).
261. See sources cited supra 260.
262. Id.
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era of extreme deference to public health authority,263 the courts found
public health agencies were acting "with an evil eye and an unequal
hand.
264
The same kind of judicial scrutiny could be found in economic
contexts. Legal economists cite with approval older commerce clause
cases where infectious disease powers masked protectionism. 265 Courts
struck down police powers that were simply a sham to exclude goods or
26services. 66 Thus, courts sought to distinguish between legitimate public
health powers (designed to exclude obvious health threats) from
illegitimate powers (designed to undermine competition).267 Thus, liberals,
whether civil or economic, insist on inquiring whether an infectious
disease threat is real or simply masks group prejudice or economic self-
protection.
4. Liberal Perspectives on the "Hard Case" of Moderate Risk
Liberal theory, then, supports state action to avert a significant threat
and denounces state action arbitrarily or pretextually exercised. For
liberals, however, evaluating the legitimacy of targeted state action to
reduce a moderate risk to the population presents a much harder case. It is
difficult because the government acts with evidence of a serious potential
threat to health and security and employs plausible means to diminish the
risk. However, the state is unable to be specific about the threat's nature
(i.e., which biological agent will be deployed and how), timing (when the
event will occur), or probability (how likely is the event) of the threat.268
263. See State ex rel. Conway v. Southern Pac. Co., 145 P.2d 530, 532 (Ariz. 1943) (quoting
that "where the police power is set in motion in its proper sphere, the courts have no jurisdiction
to stay the arm of the legislative branch") (quoting State ex rel. McBride v. Superior Court, 174 P.
973, 976 (Wash. 1918)); see also LEROY PARKER & ROBERT H. WORTHINGTON, THE LAW OF
PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY, AND THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF BOARDS OF HEALTH 5 (Albany,
N.Y., 1892) (M. Bender) ("[T]he legislature has a discretion which will not be reviewed by the
courts; for it is not a part of the judicial functions to criticise the propriety of legislative action in
matters which are within the authority of the legislative body.").
264. Jew Ho, 103 F. at 24 (invalidating the quarantine requirement); Wong Wai, 103 F. at 1
(invalidating the vaccination requirement); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74
(1886) (finding unlawful discrimination when a San Francisco ordinance prohibiting persons from
operating public laundries without consent of the Board of Supervisors was enforced only against
Chinese owners).
265. Epstein, Let the Shoemaker Stick to His Last, supra note 244, at 5139-48.
266. See id. at 5145.
267. In Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465,472-74 (1877), the Supreme Court "unhesitatingly
admitted" that the state's police power allows a prohibition against entrance of people, animals, and
goods that carries with it the danger of transmitting any contagious or infectious disease. However,
the Court invalidated the state regulation at issue under the dormant commerce clause because the
state went "beyond what was absolutely necessary for its self-protection." Id. at 472.
268. For a more complete discussion, see supra Part I.
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The state cannot point to any particular person whose actions pose the risk.
Instead, the government sweeps more broadly to collect the data needed
to inform itself about threats to health and security.
The moderate risk scenario poses the usual trade-offs seen in the
homeland security project. The public appears to accept some diminution
of privacy in exchange for a greater level of security (e.g., searches of
property and persons at airports), but not all diminution (e.g., profiling at
airports). 69 These trade-offs occur in the public health context as well.
Agencies conduct surveillance of personally identifiable health records to
serve as an early warning system of bioterrorism or naturally occurring
disease threats. 7 ° Liberals are conflicted about this scenario. Most liberals
agree with named reporting for certain diseases (e.g., tuberculosis and
smallpox), but not other diseases (HIV).27 Most also agree with routine
surveillance hedged with rigorous safeguards, but oppose broader
surveillance, particularly where safeguards are diminished in a public
health emergency.272
Liberals stress autonomy and privacy over public goods. If the conflict
can be avoided almost entirely (in the significant and well targeted
categories), liberalism will support diminished autonomy. However, if the
conflict is unmistakable (in the moderate risk category), liberal instincts
are to prefer individual rights over public goods. For a liberal, much of the
calculation depends on the details: how invasive is the intervention and
how strong are the safeguards against abuse? As we will see,
communitarians also seek a balance, but their instincts are decidedly in the
opposite direction.
B. Communitarianism
Support for public health and security comes more naturally to a
communitarian than to a liberal. 7 Communitarianism is a philosophy that
269. See Editorial, The New Airport Profiling, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 1I, 2003, at A24 (opposing
electronic profiling of air travelers for security purposes and noting similarities with the Pentagon's
proposed Total Information Awareness project designed to track the activities of millions of
Americans).
270. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 174, at 689.
271. Civil libertarians, for example, oppose named HIV reporting, but agree to AIDS
reporting. See id. at 684-86; Gostin et al., supra note 174, at 1162.
272. For example, civil libertarians supported the Model State Public Health Privacy Act,
which permitted surveillance under strict conditions, but rejected the MSEHPA because the
surveillance was too broad and safeguards insufficient. Compare Lawrence 0. Gostin et al.,
Informational Privacy and the Public's Health: the Model State Public Health Privacy Act, 91 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 1388, 1389 (2001), with Mariner, supra note 192.
273. The most prominent modem communitarian thinkers include: ALASDAIR MACINTYRE,
AFTER VIRTUE 156 (2d ed. 1984) (claiming that the notion of the political community as a common
project is alien to the modem liberal individualist world); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S
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holds that individuals can flourish as moral beings and political agents
only within the context of a community." 4 The idea of community
(characterized by a shared set of social bonds or a social web) is not
precise,275 but includes the role and value of social and civic institutions
in shaping people's lives-e.g., families, neighborhoods, churches, and
schools.276 Sometimes, of course, communitarians favor community values
that are inconsistent with the public's health. For example, certain
religious or family values urge sexual abstinence over proven disease
control measures, like condom use. Nevertheless, modem communitarians
DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 11-13(1996) (critiquing liberalism's
core assumption that society is composed of autonomous individuals who freely choose values for
themselves, given that most individuals are enshrined in networks they do not choose, like family
ties and religious organizations); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF SELF (1989) (arguing that
individuals exist in a neutral framework, constituted by universally valid commitments existing in
a moral space, and defined in the sense in which things have significance to the particular
individual); ROBERTO M. UNGER, POLITICS: A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL THEORY (1987)
(championing emancipation from false necessity, whereby no particular form of social constraint
is necessary or inescapable); WALZER, supra note 250, at 29 (advocating for multiple spheres of
justice, and declaring community "conceivably the most important good.").
274. Communitarianism can be traced to Aristotle who argued that moral and political virtue
could be achieved only in thepolis. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. 1, ch. 2, 53-55 (Benjamin Jowett
trans., The Modem Library 1943) (n.d.):
When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough
to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in
the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life....
The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the
individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in
relation to the whole .... For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but,
when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all .... But justice is the
bond of men in states, for the administration ofjustice, which is the determination
of what is just, is the principle of order in political society.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The linguistic and historical origins of the police power demonstrate a close
association between government and civilization: politia (the state), polls (city), and politeia
(citizenship). See GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW, supra note 2, at 48. Similarly, Hegel stressed the
importance of various forms of community-the family, civic community, and the state. G.W.F.
HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §§ 158-360 (S.W. Dyde trans., G. Bell & 1896); see also DANIEL
BELL, COMMUNiTARIANISM AND ITS CRITICS 1 (1993) (citing the Preamble to "The Responsive
Communitarian Platform Rights and Responsibilities," signed by over fifty communitarians:
"Neither human existence nor individual liberty can be sustained for long outside the
interdependent and overlapping communities to which we all belong.").
275. Commentators criticize communitarian thinking because of its imprecision, using
concepts like community and common goods. See, e.g., Allen E. Buchanan, Assessing the
Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 99 ETHICS 852, 855 (1989).
276. See AMITAI ETZIONI, Old Chestnuts and New Spurs, in NEW COMMUNiTARIAN THINKING:
PERSONS, VIRTUES, INSTITUTIONS, AND COMMUNImTi 16, 17, 49 (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1995).
do stress the value of healthy people in healthy communities, which is
highly compatible with population health.277
Just as liberals often define themselves through a repudiation of
utilitarianism, so too do modem communitarians define themselves
through a critique of liberalism.27  Liberal individualists who
conceptualize the self and human dignity exclusively in terms of autonomy
and self-direction, do not recognize the value of community as constitutive
of moral character, and strictly prioritize the "right" over the "good. 279
Liberals write as if the major concern of social morality were the
protection of individual interests and rights against state incursion.28 °
Communitarians see the intense focus on personal rights and the
dichotomy between individuals and the state as imbalanced and overly
simplistic.28'
Communitarians understand the undeniable desire and need of people
for vigor and long life, paying special attention to the public's health.2"2
Security of mind and body is every bit as essential to human flourishing
as autonomy and freedom.283 Human health holds a singular importance
in all societies, irrespective of culture and religion.284 The normative
standing of health can be explained by its value to individuals and
communities as a whole.28 5
277. See, e.g., Etzioni, supra note 217, at 102.
278. See, e.g., STEPHEN MULHALL & ADAM SWIFt, LIBERALS AND COMMUNITARIANS 157-64
(1992). Communitarians also reject egalitarian theory like John Rawls' difference principle, which
provides that although there must be equal basic liberties, there may be "inequalities that benefit
the least-advantaged members of society." See Michael J. Sandel, The Procedural Republic and
the Unencumbered Self, 12 Poc. THEORY 81, 88-90 (1984):
What the difference principle requires, but cannot provide, is some way of
identifying those among whom the assets I bear are properly regarded as common,
some way of seeing ourselves as mutually indebted and morally engaged to begin
with.... [T]he constitutive aims and attachments [that is, a role in a community
that could define a person in such a significant manner that the person could not
understand himself without it] that would save and situate the difference principle
are precisely the ones denied to the liberal self; the moral encumbrances and
antecedent obligations they imply would undercut the priority of right.
Id.
279. See supra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
280. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 197, at 355-57.
281. See AMrTAi ETZIoNI, THE NEW GOLDEN RuLE: COMMUNITY AND MORALITY IN A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 244-27 (1996).
282. See id.
283. See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF SOCIOLOGY 574-81 (Neil J. Smelser ed. 1988) (noting the
position of health in our society and the impact that ill-health can have on a society).
284. See id.
285. GOsTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW, supra note 2, at 9.
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The benefits of health to each person are indisputable. Health has
compelling value in itself because it is important for much of the joy,
creativity, and productivity that a person derives from life. A certain level
of vitality and absence from pain or disability allows individuals to
function in society. Healthy people, for example, are better able to assure
their survival by attaining the necessities of life-food, water, clothing,
and shelter. And they are better able to pursue their hobbies, projects,
ambitions, and dreams.
Perhaps not as obvious, however, health also is essential for
communities. Without minimal levels of health, populations cannot fully
engage in the social, economic, and political interactions necessary for
community survival. Health is foundational for engaging in many aspects
of public life--e.g., participation in the political process, generation of
wealth and economic prosperity, and provision for the common defense
and welfare. Public health, then, becomes a transcendent value because a
basic level of human functioning is a prerequisite for engaging in activities
that are critical to communities." 6
Theories of democracy (which are closely connected to communitarian
thinking)2 7 help explain the value of public health and security. One
proponent of democratic theory, Michael Walzer, has articulated an
essential truth about the nature and purposes of political communities:
"Membership is important because of what the members of a political
community owe to one another.... And the first thing they owe is the
communal provision of security and welfare."2 Public health, according
to Walzer, is a clear example of a general communal provision because
state action is intended to benefit all or most of the population.28 9
A political community stresses a shared bond among members:
organized society safeguards the common goods of health, welfare, and
security, while members subordinate themselves to the welfare of the
community as a whole.29 ° Public health can be achieved only through
collective action, not through individual endeavor. 9' The community has
a stake in hygiene and sanitation, clean air and surface water,
uncontaminated food and drinking water, and control of infectious disease.
Acting alone, individuals cannot assure even minimum levels of health.
286. See generally DANIELS, supra note 205; Dan W. Brock & Normal Daniels, Ethical
Foundations of the Clinton Administration's Proposed Health Care System, 271 JAMA 1189
(1994).
287. Some commentators do not regard the theories of democracy offered by Michael Walzer
and others as within the mainstream of communitarian thought, but many do. See, e.g., Buchanan,
supra note 275, at 852.
288. WALZER, supra note 250, at 64.
289. Id. at 65-66.
290. Id. at 64-66.
291. Id. at 65.
Although individuals may procure personal medical services and many of
the necessities of living (e.g., a person of means can purchase a home,
clothing, and food), no single individual or group of individuals can assure
his or her health. Meaningful protection and assurance of the population's
health require communal effort. Similarly, in terms of the homeland
security project, individuals cannot realistically protect themselves, but
rather they rely on government to guard against conventional, biological,
chemical, and radiological threats.
At first sight, liberal and communitarian responses to the legitimacy of
state power appear quite different. However, these two philosophical
traditions diverge only in the harder cases. Like liberals, communitarians
have little trouble recognizing the legitimacy of state action to avert a
significant threat. After all, government is most assuredly within its valid
range of authority when intervening to prevent probable and serious harms
to populations. So too would communitarians join liberals in rejecting
state action to avert a negligible risk, or where the state acts arbitrarily
(without good reason) or disingenuously (e.g., as a subterfuge for
discrimination). In this scenario, communitarians realize there are few
tangible benefits to collective health and security. Indeed, capricious or
discriminatory interventions have adverse effects on community because
they unravel the social fabric. People feel exposed and vulnerable to state
overreaction to low-level risk.
Like liberals, communitarians would have a more difficult time with
the hard case of moderate risk, but they would grant the state more
latitude. They would recognize the deficiencies in government
claims-lack of specificity in the risk assessment and lack of clarity in the
efficacy of the intervention. Yet, they would stress the government's
obligation to safeguard health and security. Communitarians would not see
a stark conflict between individuals and the oppressive state. Rather, they
would perceive the government, acting on behalf of the population, as
seeking to reduce a risk common to all. Ideas of community would lead
them to conclude that everyone would be better off if each person ceded
a small amount of liberty to achieve a safer and more secure population.
Communitarians, like liberals, would be concerned with the details: How
can legitimate communal interests be balanced against bona fide
individual claims in any given case? In theory and practice, liberals and
communitarians would make the calculations differently. In Part IV of this
Article, I present a framework for balancing that, while not resolving the
disagreements, offers a principled basis for liberty-limiting public health
interventions.
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IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR BALANCING THE GOODS OF PERSONAL
FREEDOM AND PUBLIC SECURITY
As described in Part I, bioterrorist attacks from rogue countries or non-
state actors pose a risk to the public's health. The relative low cost, ease
of transport, and difficulty of detection makes bioweapons attractive to
those intending to inflict harm and widespread fear on civil society. The
fact that several countries have developed such weapons and fringe groups
have used them (with minor success), is further evidence that bioweapons
are technically feasible and that some people desire the capability.
Biological agents already have been used within the United States, and
there are strong indicators that the public health infrastructure is currently
unprepared to cope with a large-scale attack. These risks require society
to contemplate measures designed to avert an attack or minimize the
impact should an attack occur.
The question faced is not whether the government should have liberty-
limiting authority designed to cope with an attack, but what powers the
state should have under what circumstances. American society prizes
liberty and freedom, openness and tolerance; these values are part of the
national identity and seem sometimes to rise to the level of inviolable
tenets. These values, important in their own right, need to be balanced
against equally valid values of population health and safety.
The task for society is to grant government power in a way that clearly
separates the warranted (true-risk reduction) from the unwarranted
(negligible-risk reduction or pretext for unfair treatment). That task is
difficult enough even though most clear thinkers agree in principle about
the legitimacy of state action in these contexts. What is still more difficult
is setting justifiable boundaries for state action to address moderate risk
situations where government cannot be sure of the precise parameters of
the threat society faces. How can the law help assure that citizens' lives
are secure, while preserving their values?
The answer to this question first requires a careful balance between
individual and collective interests. The law must seriously consider
authentic liberal claims to human dignity and tolerance of ethnic and
religious minorities. At the same time, legal scholars should recognize that
individual choices are shaped by the social context in which people live.
The law also must take account of bonafide group interests, including a
community's claim to a certain level of health, safety, and security. The
law's objective, then, should be to take both private (personal freedom)
and public (the social dimensions of human existence) interests seriously,
recognizing that neither is dispensable.292
292. See BELL, supra note 274, at I I-13.
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The problem with constructing legal standards and procedures for state
action is that any formulation necessarily expresses a preference for one
set of interests over another, even if government seeks to respect both.
Setting the legal standard too high effectively thwarts legitimate collective
interests because, in practice, government action is chilled if not blocked.
Setting the standard too low results in the opposite error of excessive
deference to state action. The law cannot calibrate precisely enough to
split the difference exactly.
Society's preferred values will become transparent in the political
process. My point, however, is that there is no reason, a priori, for
choosing one set of values over the other. In particular, I do not concede
that liberalism should be the default preference. Rights, in other words, do
not invariably trump common good. Thus, if government can point to a
moderate risk and propose interventions that are reasonably well targeted
and not unduly burdensome, the law should permit a sphere of state action.
By doing so, each person bears a small burden (equitably distributed), but
as members of a community all gain in the social exchange.
My refusal to cede to the primacy of individualism is animated by my
concern for public safety in a health emergency. It is important that the
government has the authority to act quickly should a bioterrorist attack
occur. Quick action will be required on the part of both federal and local
governments to minimize the impact of the attack and to protect the
population.293 The federal government will need to move supplies from the
National Pharmaceutical Stockpile294 in ways that distribute resources
fairly and quickly enough to help those affected. Similarly, plans designed
to mobilize experts from the CDC must provide for a prompt response,295
and the federal government must be prepared to provide support for state
293. See e.g., Timothy Aeppel, Early-Warning Bioterrorism Project Puts University of
Pittsburgh on Bush Itinerary, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2002, at A20 (noting that "[s]peed is critical.
'For an hour lost, the number of deaths can be in the hundreds or thousands. This tight coupling
between detection and response is vital to stemming the numbers of illnesses and death that can
occur using slower methods of detection"' (quoting Dr. Michael Wagner)); see also Erin McClam,
CDC: Faces Harsh Criticism, AM. HEALTH LINE, Oct. 24, 2001 (noting the criticism that the CDC
received for failing to immediately test persons suspected of coming in contact with anthrax and
for delaying treatment).
294. The National Pharmaceutical Stockpile was developed to provide pharmaceuticals,
antidotes, and other medical supplies and equipment in the event of a biological or chemical attack
on civilian populations. Ctrs. For Disease Control & Prevention, Strategic National Stockpile, (Aug.
11,2003), available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/stockpile/index.asp. Twelve-hour Push Packages (so
named because they are intended to arrive within twelve hours or less) and other vendor-managed
inventory supplies are stored in strategic locations around the country. Id. The packages are
designed to include nearly everything a state will need to respond to a broad range of threats.
295. Currently, the CDC plans to deploy a team of five or six experts at the same time the
twelve-hour Push Package is delivered. Id. The teams include pharmacists, emergency responders,
and logistics experts. Id.
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and local governments that may be overwhelmed by the sudden drastic
increase in public health needs.
State and local governments must have the ability to act quickly as
well. If a contagious disease agent is used, compulsory powers, like
quarantine, will be effective only if they are used during the early stages
of the outbreak.296 Otherwise, those who were initially infected will spread
the disease to their contacts, and those contacts to their own contacts, until
the geographical area affected is too vast to make quarantine plausible and
effective.297 Laws and regulations that provide for compulsory powers in
a fair and expeditious manner must be in place in order to avoid delays
that would render the quarantine moot. In addition, state and local
governments must have surveillance mechanisms in place for early
detection. Timely identification of a health threat will facilitate
distribution of needed resources (e.g., medical personnel, medicine, and
hospital equipment) in an equitable and expedient way. While careful
consideration of policy choices and extensive deliberation are hallmarks
of democracy, this reflection must take place now, so that when the
government is called upon to act, it is able to do so in time to be useful.
A. Elements of the Framework
A successful framework would allow the government to act quickly in
response to an emergency, but not allow individual liberties to be reduced
to an unacceptable level. 98 The best way to work toward this balance is to
make use of traditionally successful mechanisms, like the democratic
process, checks and balances, clear criteria for decisionmaking, and
judicial procedures designed to control the abuse of power by
governmental agencies. In addition, the framework could adopt the
modem concept of "shielding"-the governmental duty to engage the
community in voluntary measures of self-protection as a "less restrictive
alternative" to compulsion.299 This would involve government/community
partnerships, including effective state communication about health risks
and self-preservation.
In truth, adoption of this framework will not guarantee an appropriate
balance between liberty and security. The framework cannot assure that
politically accountable government will act for the common good if
296. See Aeppel, supra note 293.
297. See Barbera et al., supra note 139, at 2711.
298. See generally David Fidler, Legal Issues Surrounding Public Health Emergencies,
Address at the Second National Symposium on Medical & Public Health Response (Nov. 29,2000)
(suggesting an approach to respond to the risk of bioterrorism given the current state of our legal
and public health system), available at http://www.hopkins-biodefense.org/sympcast/
transcripts/transfidl.html.
299. See infra notes 313-19 and accompanying text.
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liberalism remains the prevalent social value. The framework, however,
is more likely to prevent government overreaching because it relies on a
model of separation of powers. Yet, if the electorate gains confidence that
checks on power will prevent governmental excesses, perhaps it will cede
greater authority to the state to protect the public's health. That, at least,
is the theory behind strong powers hedged with substantive and procedural
safeguards.
1. The Democratic Process
Public health policy is riddled with contradictions. Agency officials
seek power without constraint. Since they are "experts," they resist
substantive or procedural fetters on their decisions. Public health officials
often distrust the lay public or their elected representatives, believing they
do not understand the sciences of public health and are ill-suited to make
sound judgments about infectious disease.00 The liberal public, on the
other hand, prefers strict limits on agency action. They, in turn, often do
not trust "experts" to provide objective information and respect individual
rights.30'
The resolution of these differences should take place in the policy
making branch of government. Legislators, although not experts, have a
fiduciary duty to the public, which should include assuring the public's
health and safety. At the same time, the legislature is accountable to the
electorate and should avoid undue restrictions on individual freedoms.
Legislatures obviously cannot make detailed choices in response to an
emergency but, as suggested below, should put in place clear criteria and
procedures for agency action.
One of the best ways to ensure that trade-offs are legitimate is to
submit them to the democratic process. Democracy, of course, is a highly
complex abstraction, but I use it here in at least two respects: civic
deliberation and representational policy-making. As to the first, forward
thinkers urge greater community involvement in public health
decisionmaking so that policy formation becomes a genuinely civic
endeavor.0 2 Under this view, citizens would strive to safeguard their
300. See, e.g., John M. Colmers & Daniel M. Fox, The Politics of Emergency Health Powers
and the Isolation of Public Health, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 397 (2003).
301. See id. at 398-99 (explaining distrust of public health in the political arena). For example,
only 60% of Americans have confidence that the CDC will provide correct information to protect
them from anthrax. Id. at 399.
302. E.g., Bruce Jennings, The Liberal Neutrality of Living and Dying: Bioethics,
Constitutional Law, and Political Theory in the American Right-to-Die Debate, 16 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 97, 104 (1999); see generally NANCY KARl ET AL., HEALTH AS A CIVIC
QUESTION (Nov. 28, 1994) (prepared for the American Civic Forum); Bruce Jennings, Health
Policy in a New Key: Setting Democratic Priorities, 49 J. Soc. ISSUES 169 (1993).
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communities by civic participation, open fora, and capacity building to
solve health problems. Public health authorities, for example, might
practice more deliberative forms of democracy, involving closer
consultation with consumers and the voluntary organizations that represent
them (e.g., town meetings and consumer membership on government
advisory committees). Meaningful public involvement should result in
stronger support for health policies and encourage citizens to take a more
active role in protecting themselves and their neighbors. °3
Representational policy-making is the process through which hard
choices are submitted to the legislature for decision. However, in many
cases, public health officials, outside the gaze of the media and the
political process, make choices covertly. Alternatively, society sometimes
appears willing to wait until a public health emergency arises to submit the
problem to the legislature. Representational policy-making works best
when the legislative branch deliberates well in advance of a disaster.
Through rigorous debate, legislators can consider the relative importance
of community values, in addition to various alternatives for accomplishing
goals. Democratic deliberation allows key issues to be contemplated
publicly, and elected officials to be held accountable for the decisions
made. It is important that these discussions take place overtly; the
alternative is for a reactionary approach to emergency management that
has less potential for considered decisionmaking.3 4
2. Checks and Balances
Although the legislative branch should set the broad parameters for
public health policy, there ought to be an important role for the other
branches of government. The executive branch is responsible for
implementing public health policy. Public health agencies have flexibility
to interpret legislative standards, set regulatory policy, and exercise
judgment in enforcement actions. The judiciary's role is to ensure that the
legislature sets policy (and the executive enforces policy) within
constitutional parameters;3 °5 the agency acts within the scope of the
303. See infra notes 313-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of "shielding."
304. This was the theory behind the drafting of the MSEHPA. See supra notes 11-13 and
accompanying text. The Model Act was designed after reviewing emergency health powers that
were available in different states and localities. See Gostin, Public Health Law in an Age of
Terrorism, supra note 11, at 83. The Model Act was then distributed widely, and has sparked
numerous controversies described above. Each state that considered adopting all or a portion of the
Model Act debated the provisions, and made decisions that best reflected the different values in
their respective community.
305. See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers
Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 610 (2001):
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legislative delegation of power;30 6 and the agency complies with legislative
criteria and procedures for action. 7 Distributing power throughout the
three branches of government allows some assurance that none of the
branches will overreach in ways that are detrimental to individual
freedoms.3"'
A system of checks and balances provides the best prospect for sorting
out warranted from unwarranted use of power. If the public health agency
acts to reduce a significant health risk, it will be more likely to gain
support from other branches of government. If it acts arbitrarily or
discriminatorily, the other branches are more likely to hold the agency to
account.309
Although a classic design for separation of powers is important, it helps
solve only one of the problems addressed in this Article. Checks and
balances primarily restrain government by making it more difficult for any
single branch to act. This has the undisputed value of curbing abuse of
power, but may dampen decisive action to avert health threats. Separation
of powers offers little to ensure that government meets its responsibilities
of public security.
Professor Redish, for example, explains that under his approach, the Court's role
in separation-of-powers cases is to be limited to determining whether the
challenged branch action falls within the definition of that branch's
constitutionally derived powers-executive, legislative or judicial. If the answer
is yes, the branch's action is constitutional; if the answer is no, the action is
unconstitutional. No other questions are to be asked; no other countervailing
factors are to be taken into account.
Id. (citing MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLTICAL STRUCTURE 101 (1995)); see also
THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that the judiciary's sole role is to enforce
the constitution-i.e., thejudiciary must ensure that both the executive and the legislative branches
are acting within the powers enumerated to them in Articles I and II of the Constitution).
306. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
307. Id.
308. The Model Act follows a classic design for separation of powers. The Governor is
empowered to declare a public health emergency. See MSEHPA, supra note 8, § 401. Declaring
such an emergency gives the Governor certain powers over property and persons. E.g., id. § 403.
However, the legislative branch checks the executive: the legislature sets the standards for a
declaration and, by majority vote, it may terminate the declaration. E.g., id. § 405(c). This ensures
that an overzealous Governor will not have extraordinary powers if they are not appropriate. Not
only will he or she be accountable at the time of the next election, but also the legislature retains
oversight. E.g., id. § 405(c). The Act permits the courts to review the decisions of the Governor and
public health agency. Id. § 706. If the executive does not adhere to legislative standards or
procedural due process, its decisions can be overturned. E.g., id. § 706.
309. See, e.g., supra notes 260-64 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial role in
prohibiting discriminatory use of quarantine during the San Francisco bubonic plague epidemic).
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3. Standards of Decisionnaking
The legislature also should specify clear criteria for the exercise of
public health powers. Objective standards have at least two positive
effects. First, the political branch of government specifies in advance of
a threat the conditions under which it will countenance the use of
compulsion. The legislature, as discussed above, can deliberate about the
appropriate conditions for coercion and remains politically accountable.
Second, the use of clear criteria has a constraining effect on public health
agencies. Deciding ahead of time what elements must be present for the
executive branch to intervene offers some protection against policy based
on suspect motives or irrational public fear. By circumscribing the
conditions under which agencies can exercise power, it is possible to
permit effective action while reigning in governmental excesses.
Most existing infectious disease statutes afford agencies broad
discretion without setting clear standards for the exercise of power.31° This
approach affords public health officials broad authority and makes it
difficult to hold them accountable. Although health officials may prefer
wide statutory mandates that grant them flexibility, they are not well
served by such legislative inattention to standards. If agencies need to
exercise strong power, they are more likely to gain political and public
acceptance if they can point to a clear legislative standard supporting their
decisions.31'
4. Proceaural Protections
Clear standards for agency action can limit discretion, helping ensure
that power is exercised only where needed. Yet, there is still a need for
procedural safeguards. Procedural due process has an instrumental and
normative value in the context of a public health emergency. Primarily,
due process helps ensure that compulsory powers are correctly applied. By
affording individuals the right to a fair hearing, there is increased certainty
that the individual actually is infectious, poses a risk to others, and cannot
or will not comply with public health advice.
Even if due process cannot always ensure the accuracy of
decisionmaking, there is a normative value in granting a right to a hearing.
310. See Gostin et al., supra note 9.
311. The Model Act sets clear standards both for the Governor's declaration and for the
agency's exercise of power. The Model Act allows a Governor's Declaration only on a finding of
a "public health emergency," based on scientific risk assessment. MSEHPA, supra note 8, § 401.
To declare an emergency there must be a potential for serious or long-term health consequences
for the population. Id. § 104(m). Similarly, public health agencies cannot exercise compulsory
power without a showing of significant risk to the public. Id. § 104(m); § 403. Cabining state power
through explicit criteria is important to a successful framework for emergency preparedness.
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Government demonstrates respect for individuals by allowing them to see
the evidence against them and present their case to an impartial fact finder.
There is a self-expressive importance to procedural due process; fair
procedures allow individuals to convey a sense of grievance that has
intrinsic worth. There also is a value to racial, ethnic, or religious groups
that feel singled out unfairly for coercion. By allowing members of the
group to articulate the perceived unfairness in an open and deliberative
process, the group gains a collective sense of being heard.
Procedural due process also is important to public acceptance of the
legitimacy of the governmental action. The public is more likely to agree
to liberty-limiting powers if there is recourse for challenging those that are
perceived as unjust. Procedural safeguards can be seen as a hedge against
many of the wrongful actions of government such as arbitrary interference,
individual discrimination, and group prejudice. As a result, procedural
protections should be integrated into the law whenever serious
curtailments of individual liberty are envisioned." 2
5. "Shielding": Government/Community Relationships as a Less
Restrictive Alternative to Coercion
Some scholars advocate government engagement with the community
to promote measures of self-protection-a modem concept known as
"shielding." '313  Shielding operates on a macro-level, known as
"community-shielding," and on a micro-level, labeled "self-shielding."3 4
It empowers the public to engage in protective measures that have positive
security and protective impact at the individual, community, and
ultimately, national level.3 5 To be successful, shielding requires
"partnership of government, business, media, and the public, operating
under the best scientific and medical practices, to break the disease cycle
and ensure minimal disruption to the routine activities of the nation. 316
312. The Model Act sets a high standard for procedural due process by requiring notice,
representation, and ajudicial hearing when quarantine or isolation is sought. Id. § 9-103. Ofcourse,
in order for the quarantine and isolation to be effective, agency action may have to be taken
quickly. In such cases, the Model Act allows for prompt review after the quarantine or isolation to
protect individual rights and the public good. Id. § 9-103(b). Similarly, the Model Act provides for
judicial review of agency decisions that deprive businesses of property interests. Id. § 9-103(e).
Without judicial review and procedural protections in place, the government is unconstrained and
can more easily abuse emergency powers.
313. See M. Barkun, Community Shielding and the Political System, 4 INT'L J. EMERGENCY
MENTAL HEALTH 265 (2002); S.E. Spaulding et al., Legal Framework for Shielding, 4 INT'L J.
EMERGENCY MENTAL HEALTH 259 (2002); see generally CRITCAL INCIDENT ANALYSIS GROUP,
WHAT IS TO BE DONE? EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC RESPONSE TO BIOTERRORISM (2002).
314. See sources cited supra note 313.
315. See id.
316. S.D. Prior et al., Foundations of Shielding, 4 INT'L J. EMERGENCY MENTAL HEALTH 235
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Shielding often is seen as an alternative to compulsory measures.
Scholars particularly urge its use as a noncoercive model of mass civil
confinement: "a form of insulation wherein individuals and groups employ
a self-imposed isolation, or quarantine, within their natural surrounding for
a temporary period of time."3 7 Under this reasoning, government, far in
advance of an actual attack, should "prepare the public to stay in place
voluntarily, to resist the impulse to flee to family and friends outside the
initial danger zone." '318
The shielding concept could usefully be placed within the legal
framework for bioterrorism preparedness by requiring government to
supplement (although not supplant) compulsory powers with voluntary
approaches. As a form of least drastic means, the law would require public
health authorities to provide mechanisms for keeping the public informed
about the health emergency, its effects, and the ways in which the public
can minimize the impact of the event on themselves and their
communities. Preparing a means of effective communication is important
in gaining the public's trust and avoiding panic. In addition, it allows the
state to use the resources of the community effectively.
Public cooperation is important to the success of counter-bioterrorism
interventions. If resources, like medicines, vaccines, or other supplies,
need to be distributed, the public will need to follow public health advice
and approach distribution points in a rational state of mind to prevent
chaos. Similarly, if quarantine or isolation is mandated, the cooperation of
the public is crucial to its success. A panicked public will require a much
greater force of peacekeepers-police or the National Guard, for
instance-to maintain order. Building the public's trust through
communicating correct and timely information is crucial to successful
management of any emergency.
In addition to helping maintain order, communicating clearly with the
public will contribute to individuals coping with the threat. Community
members can make real contributions to emergency management.319 Civic
groups can use existing channels of communication to organize volunteers
or serve as distribution points and educators can be used to spread
important messages. In addition to building trust and reducing panic,
effective communication can ensure that existing community resources are
used to the maximum benefit.
(2002).
317. Id.; see OFFICE FOR HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY
(2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book.
318. David Glenn, Panic Button, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 14, 2003, at A14.
319. In fact, nonprofessionals have saved the majority of those rescued in disasters. Thomas
A. Glass & Monica Schoch-Spana, Bioterrorism and the People: How to Vaccinate a CityAgainst
Panic, 34 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 217, 219 (2002).
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The framework offered contemplates strong public health powers
hedged by classic safeguards-democratic processes, checks and balances,
substantive criteria, procedural due process, and less restrictive
alternatives. Rather than shying away from effective government action,
the framework authorizes it within clearly defined parameters. The
framework, therefore, takes both personal and collective interests
seriously. It aspires to sort out clearly warranted (the significant risk
category) from unwarranted (the arbitrary or discriminatory category) state
action. Ultimately, policy will be formed within the political process. This
will leave some discontented, particularly those who believe strongly that
either individualism or public security is sacrosanct.
V. JUSTIFYING LIBERTY-LIMITING PUBLIC HEALTH POWER
In this Article, I ask how far personal and economic liberties can be
restricted to protect the public's health and security. My answer, far from
being simple, posits three risk categories. Category one involves well-
targeted state action designed to avert a significant risk to the public's
health. Here, I demonstrate why there is a convergence of liberal and
communitarian thought, both supporting state action. This analysis should
help scholars and policy makers to reject extreme political arguments that
voluntarism is always preferable to compulsion, and that no trade-offs are
required between private rights and public goods.
The second risk category involves state power exercised arbitrarily or
pretextually. Here, I also demonstrate a convergence of political thought,
both rejecting state power. Political theory should support widely-shared
intuitions that government interventions in the absence of risk or
motivated by animus are illegitimate.
The final risk category involves state action to avert a moderate risk.
In this classification, the government has good grounds for believing the
risk is real and its methods are well targeted to reduce the risk. However,
there are key deficiencies in the state's case, like the absence of an
identifiable person threatening harm and the absence of sufficient evidence
about the nature and probability of the risk. Here, I suggest that there are
hard trade-offs and that there is no reason, apriori, to prefer personal over
collective interests, or vice versa. Decisions of this kind ought to properly
be determined within the political process, although I express my own
preference for treating both sets of interests seriously.
The Article is more explanatory and analytical than prescriptive. I do
suggest a framework for sorting out warranted from unwarranted state
action and for working through the hard cases. Nevertheless, the
framework offered cannot do the hard work required to resolve the
inevitable tensions. What it can do is structure decisions to prevent state
overreaching. By providing classic safeguards, the framework might
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facilitate political decisions to allow the exercise of power to safeguard the
public's health. In the end, it is likely that neither side of the political
divide will be entirely satisfied. For those who see the world as a struggle
between an oppressive state and individuals desiring freedom, even strong
safeguards may not suffice. For those who see a beneficent government
seeking to protect its citizens, the framework offers little encouragement
because of its focus on governmental restraint. My overriding purpose is
to build a bridge between two often diametrically opposed political
theories, demonstrating why each has importance in the perennial, often
contentious debate, on liberty and the public's health.
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